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HARMONIZING SUBSTANTIVE-CRIMINAL-LAW
VALUES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
CASE OF ALFORD AND NOLO
CONTENDERE PLEASt
Stephanos Bibastt
Criminal procedure is preoccupied with procedural values such as effi-
ciency, accuracy, informed choice, and procedural fairness. This emphasis
comes at the expense of the values of criminal procedure's sibling, substantive
criminal law. This Article examines Alford and nolo contendere pleas as
case studies in how an obsession with these procedural values blinds courts
and scholars to substantive values. Defendants can in effect plead guilty by
entering Alford and nolo contendere pleas, even if they protest their inno-
cence or refuse to admit guilt. These pleas risk not only convicting innocent
defendants, but also impeding the reform, education, and condemnation of
guilty defendants. Moreover, these pleas leave psychological denial mecha-
nisms in place, especially in the case of sex offenders. Regardless of how
defendants respond, these pleas muddy the denunciation of the crime instead
of vindicating victims as well as the community's moral norms, such as hon-
esty and responsibility. Pleas should be reserved for those who confess. Trials
are morality plays designed to acquit innocent defendants and teach lessons
to guilty defendants who will not confess, while vindicating their victims
and the community. This approach leads to a rethinking of plea procedures
and the roles of lawyers, judges, and trials in the criminal justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
Criminal procedure has for too long treated itself as a subset of
constitutional law,' in the process distancing itself from substantive
criminal law. Although substantive criminal law sometimes discusses
how well rules deter, rehabilitate, or exact retribution, these substan-
tive values are largely absent from criminal procedure. Instead, crimi-
nal procedure seems to care only about whether procedures are
efficient, constitutional, fair, and accurate. This artificial separation is
unfortunate. Criminal procedure is not simply a subset of constitu-
tional law. It is a sibling of criminal law, though our narrow curricular
blinders keep us from seeing the import of this fact. A procedure may
be constitutional, efficient, procedurally fair, and even accurate but
still be deeply unwise. If the procedure undermines important values
of substantive criminal law, we should reject it no matter how efficient
it is.
The divorce of procedure from substance manifests itself in guilty
plea procedures.2 The standard defense of plea bargaining is that
guilty pleas save time and money, reduce uncertainty, and empower
parties by promoting freedom of choice." These procedural values
focus on the choices and costs parties face in court. The standard
critique of plea bargaining is that guilty pleas undercut proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, adversary hearings, and other procedural safe-
guards. 4 Once again, most of these objections rest on procedural val-
ues rather than the values of substantive criminal law. This Article
I See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE 14. 1, 6 (1997) (noting that "[c]riminal procedure is, basically, a subset of
constitutional law," and decrying the artificial separation between criminal procedure and
substance to which this leads).
2 1 use the terms "substance" and "substantive criminal law" to distinguish the body
of law that defines crimes from the procedures used to enforce them. My focus is not on
the actns reus and uiens rea elements of particular crimes, but rather on the justifications for
punishment that underlie these crimes.
3 See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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does not wade into the broader debate over the desirability of plea
bargaining. Instead, it assumes that plea bargaining will persist for
the foreseeable future and uses the plea bargaining literature to illus-
trate the foci of proceduralists: efficiency and autonomy versus accu-
racy and fairness.5
This Article challenges the proceduralist approach to criminal
procedure, using two subsets of pleas as case studies. 6 First, the law
has long allowed defendants to plead nolo contendere, which means
that they refuse to admit guilt but accept punishment as if guilty. 7
More recently, the Supreme Court has approved so-called Alford pleas,
in which defendants plead guilty while simultaneously protesting their
innocence." Far from criticizing these practices, Frank Easterbrook
and most other scholars praise these pleas as efficient, constitutional
means of resolving cases. 9 Even Albert Alschuler, a leading critic of
plea bargaining generally, supports Alford pleas as a lesser evil, a way to
empower defendants within a flawed system.' As long as plea bar-
gaining exists, he maintains, innocent defendants should be free to
use these pleas to enter advantageous plea bargains without lying."
Moreover, guilty defendants who are in denial should be empowered
to use these pleas instead of being forced to stand trial. 12 Once again,
the terms of the debate are proceduralist: efficiency and autonomy
versus accuracy and fairness.
This Article disputes this conventional wisdom. Alford and nolo
contendere pleas are unwise and should be abolished. These proce-
dures may be constitutional and efficient, but they undermine key val-
ues served by admissions of guilt in open court. They undermine the
procedural values of accuracy and public confidence in accuracy and
fairness by convicting innocent defendants and creating the percep-
tion that innocent defendants are being pressured into pleading
guilty. More basically, they allow guilty defendants to avoid accepting
responsibility for their wrongs. Guilty defendants' refusals to admit
guilt impede their repentance, education, and reform, as well as vic-
tims' healing process. In addition, pleas without confessions muddy
the criminal law's moral message. Both kinds of pleas, but especially
Alford pleas, equivocate; one might call them "guilty-but-not-guilty"
5 See infra Part I.
6 For the sake of brevity, I use "pleas" as a shorthand for pleas of nolo contendere
and guilty (including Alford pleas).
7 See infra Part II.A.
8 See infra Part II.A.
9 See infra Part II.B.
1o See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1292, 1296-97 (1975).
I1 See id. at 1289-92, 1296-98, 1306.
12 See id. at 1298.
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pleas.' They permit equivocation and ambiguity when clarity is es-
sential. This equivocation, in turn, undermines denunciation of the
defendant and vindication of the victim and the community's moral
norms. Sacrificing these substantive goals is too high a price for an
efficient plea procedure. Procedures that undercut substance have lit-
tle point, as the point of procedure is to serve substance. Yet substan-
tive values for the most part are not even on the proceduralists' radar
screens. 14 Thus, guilty pleas should be reserved for those who con-
fess. 15 Jury trials should serve not only to acquit innocent defendants,
but also to teach guilty defendants and vindicate their victims and the
community's moral norms. They are morality plays. Because criminal
law's norms include honesty and responsibility for one's actions, crim-
inal procedure should not let guilty defendants dishonestly dodge re-
sponsibility and the truth.
Consider the prominent example of Kathleen Soliah, which illus-
trates why unequivocal guilty-plea confessions serve these values better
than equivocal Alford and nolo pleas. In the 1970s, Soliah belonged to
the Symbionese Liberation Army, a radical San Francisco group that
kidnapped Patricia Hearst and tried to kill government officials. 16
Soliah fled to Minnesota and changed her name to SaraJane Olson. 17
For years, she denied belonging to the Symbionese Liberation Army
or taking part in an attempt to bomb two police cars in 1975.18 Her
lawyer expressed interest in negotiating an Alford or nolo contendere
plea, but the judge and prosecutors would not countenance such a
plea. 9 Finally, on October 31, 2001, Olson clearly and unequivocally
13 Id. at 1294.
14 This Article does not argue that substantive values should always trump procedural
values, nor does it have a simplistic metric for prioritizing or balancing the two. Instead, it
argues simply that substantive values ought at least to factor into our vocabulary, our dis-
cussion, and our consideration of procedures and procedural rules.
15 1 recognize that many guilty-plea confessions are insincere or induced by extrinsic
inducements or pressures, such as plea bargains. As I contend later in the Article, how-
ever, even a true but insincere confession is better than no confession at all. It may help to
break down the guilty defendant's denial mechanisms as the first step on the road to re-
form. Even if it does not, it teaches, heals, and vindicates the victim and society's moral
norms. See infra Part IV.B-C.
16 SeeJames Sterngold, 70's Radical Pleads Guilty in Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001,
at A]8.
17 Id.
Is Id.
19 Telephone Interview with Shawn Chapman, Partner, Vorzimer, Masserman &
Chapman, and defense counsel to Sara Jane Olson (May 28, 2002); Telephone Interview
with Eleanor Hunter, Assistant District Attorney, County of Los Angeles, and prosecutor of
Sara Jane Olson (May 28, 2002); see also Declaration of Shawn Snider Chapman 34,
38-39, 41-42 (Nov. 5, 2001) (on file with author) (declaring that a prosecutor rebuffed
the idea of a no-contest plea; also declaring that Olson initially refused to admit guilt and
the prosecutor suggested that Olson would not have to do so, but later that day the District
Attorney insisted that Olson would have to admit guilt as part of a plea agreement).
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pleaded guilty to taking part in an attempt to bomb the two cars.2
Immediately afterwards, however, Olson told reporters that she had
pleaded guilty to crimes of which she was innocent.2 ' Prosecutors
speculated that Olson had changed her story to please her friends and
family who had maintained her innocence.
22
Olson's judge, however, refused to countenance this express and
instantaneous contradiction, noting that "the integrity of the criminal
justice system is at stake."2 3 He called Olson in for another hearing
and asked her whether she wanted her plea to stand.2 4 At that hear-
ing, the judge confronted Olson and asked her, clearly and explicitly,
if she was in fact guilty. 25 She twice said yes and reaffirmed her plea.2 6
Five days later, Olson again publicly disavowed her guilt and moved to
withdraw her plea.2 7 At the next court hearing, the judge noted that
Olson found it psychologically very difficult to admit her crime to her-
self, her family, and her supporters.2 8 Relying on her previous admis-
sions and pleas of guilt, the judge denied Olson's motion to withdraw
her plea.2 9 Only after this final ruling did Olson tremble with emo-
tion and say she was sorry for harming others.30
An Alford or nolo plea in this case would have undercut impor-
tant procedural and substantive values and norms. If Olson had en-
tered an Alford plea and never admitted guilt, it would have been
wrong to punish her without an authoritative trial verdict. Instead of
eventually apologizing, she might well have persisted in her denials to
herself and to others. Continued denials would have led her friends,
Olson's judge exercised his discretion in refusing to accept an Alford or nolo con-
tendere plea, but judges elsewhere often allow such pleas. See infra Part II.C. If a different
judge had had the case and allowed an Alford plea, the outcome would have been very
different, as the text goes on to explain.
20 Sterngold, supra note 16.
21 Id.; James Sterngold, Comments by 70's Radical Cast Doubt on Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2001, at A] 2.
22 Sterngold, supra note 16.
23 James Sterngold, 70's Radical Reaffirms Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at A16
(internal quotation marks omitted).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.; James Sterngold, Waffling Again, 70's Radical Asks to Change Guilty Plea, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A20.
27 Change of Plea in Bomb Case Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A20;
Sterngold, supra note 26.
28 James Sterngold, Judge Refuses to Permit Ex-Radical to Reverse Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2001, at A12.
29 Id.
30 James Sterngold, 70's Radical Is Sentenced, Then Arraigned in New Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2002, at Al0; James Sterngold, A Radical's Tale: Compassion Then Led to Prison Now,
N.Y. TiMFS, Dec. 14, 2001, at A24; see a/soJohn M. Broder, In a Quiet End to a Case, 4 Ex-
Symbionese Liberation Army Members Plead Guilty to Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2002, at A18
(noting that Sara Jane Olson later pleaded guilty to a related murder, saying "I am truly
sorry, and I will be sorry until the day I die").
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her family, and the public to doubt the justice of the system. Punish-
ment in these circumstances would undercut the norm of punishing
only those known to be blameworthy. In addition, consistent protesta-
tions of innocence would hinder closure for the victims and the com-
munity. Here, in contrast, Olson clearly admitted guilt in court,
making her later denials less credible. The public could more easily
believe that she had falsely protested her innocence to save face. In
addition, the court could justify its ruling by pointing to Olson's ear-
lier admissions, on the advice of counsel, in open court. The court's
action vindicated the norm of not going back on one's word. Further-
more, after the judge confronted her with her earlier admissions, Ol-
son took the first steps toward apology and reconciliation. In short,
Olson's admissions of guilt in open court were much firmer bases for
conviction, repentance, and closure than an Alford or nolo plea would
have been.
The remainder of this Article consists of four parts. Part I sum-
marizes the academic debate over plea bargaining, showing how it em-
bodies criminal procedure's emphasis on procedural values. Part II
reviews the doctrines that allow Alford and nolo contendere pleas, as
well as the scholarly articles supporting these doctrines, most of which
defend these pleas on proceduralist grounds. Part II also discusses
how, when, and why lawyers and clients use these pleas to avoid admis-
sions of guilt. Part III argues that these procedures risk convicting
innocent defendants and create the perception that innocent defend-
ants are being convicted. The analysis rests on the conventional pro-
cedural values of accuracy and perceived accuracy but looks at them
through a moral lens. This type of moral argument is almost unheard
of in proceduralist literature, a clue that procedure is adrift from the
moral underpinnings of the substantive criminal law.
Part IV moves beyond Part III's conventional procedural values to
substantive-criminal-law values. In particular, it critiques Alford and
nolo contendere pleas from a moral, didactic perspective. Even if
these pleas were perfectly accurate and were so viewed, they would
undercut reform, moral education, and the vindication of victims and
the community's moral norms. Many guilty defendants are in denial
and find it hard to admit their crimes to others or even to themselves.
For them, Alford and nolo contendere pleas are easy ways to remain in
denial and still avoid the painful processes of confession or trial. Tri-
als, though less efficient than such pleas, are better at breaking
through these denials and beginning the process of reform and heal-
ing. Regardless of how defendants respond, convictions after a trial
vindicate victims, express outrage, and drive home to defendants the
wrongfulness of their crimes. In other words, the social meaning of a
jury verdict or guilty plea is much stronger and clearer than an Alford
1366 [Vol. 88:1361
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or nolo plea's muddy message. Thus, legislatures should abolish Al-
ford and nolo contendere pleas. Until they do so, prosecutors should
oppose them, and judges should exercise their discretion to reject
them. This Article concludes with thoughts on restructuring plea pro-
cedures and lawyers' and judges' roles in serving the norms and values
of the substantive criminal law.
I
THE PROCEDURALIST APPROACH TO PLEAS
The dominant approach to guilty pleas and plea bargaining fo-
cuses on procedural values such as speed, cost, efficiency, autonomy,
accuracy, and certainty. This proceduralist focus largely ignores sub-
stantive values such as reform, education, retribution, and vindication
of victims and social norms. This Article's purpose is not to take on all
pleas and bargains, but to show how proceduralists' emphasis on pro-
cedural values comes at the expense of substantive-criminal-law values.
The Supreme Court, for example, has endorsed guilty pleas be-
cause they save time and money and because they confer advantages
upon both prosecutors and defendants.3 ' Indeed, the Court's main
concern is ensuring procedural safeguards such as adequate counsel,
knowing and voluntary waivers of rights, and sufficient factual bases.3 2
Similarly, the criminal bench and bar like plea bargains because they
save time and money, cap defendants' sentences, expedite inevitable
convictions, and dispose of large caseloads. 3, Though pleas may inci-
dentally serve substantive values (such as quicker incapacitation or re-
31 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971) (stating that plea bargain-
ing "is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part" because pleas
save resources, are "prompt and largely final" dispositions, and start the correctional
processes promptly); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (stressing that guilty
pleas benefit both sides by avoiding the burdens and expenses of trial, reducing defend-
ants' maximum punishment, and speeding up final dispositions and punishment); see also
Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970) ("A reduction
from 90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the assignment of twice the judicial
manpower and facilities-judges, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, jurors and courtrooms. A
reduction to 70 per cent trebles this demand.").
32 See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62.
,33 See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 24-33, 156-57 (1978) (contending that
the bench and bar like plea bargaining because it saves time and money, caps defendants'
sentences, and expedites convictions that are almost inevitable, but disputing the hypothe-
sis that caseload pressures explain plea bargaining); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Tri-
umph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 893-904, 989-1001 (2000) (defending caseload pressure as an
explanation for the growth of plea bargaining in Massachusetts).
Of course, this generalization does not hold true for every single lawyer. A few take
criminal court appointments precisely because they want trial experience. Others may pre-
fer to work more hours in order to claim larger fees, at least when fees are computed on an
hourly basis. See United States v. Diaz, 802 F. Supp. 304, 312 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (complaining
about this practice of "fee churning"). These approaches, however, are not the norm.
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habilitation), their emphasis is on saving time and money and
allowing the parties to choose.
Scholars who support plea bargaining likewise do so because
pleas promote procedural values such as speed, cost, efficiency, and
free choice. Frank Easterbrook, a leading proponent, views criminal
justice as a market system that allows parties to sell procedural rights
in exchange for advantageous concessions.3 4 According to Easter-
brook, Robert Scott, and William Stuntz, these sales promote auton-
omy and efficiency, reduce uncertainty, and save time and money. 35
Scott and Stuntz's concerns are primarily procedural: they recognize
the need for special safeguards to prevent duress, mistake, uncon-
scionable pressures, and uninformed decisions.36 In other words, they
view plea procedures as giving defendants the information and free-
dom they need to further their own interests and desires. One might
call this the autonomy model; it focuses on defendants' current
desires instead of seeking to reshape or trump those desires.
Critics of plea bargaining focus on classic procedural values such
as accuracy and procedural fairness. Albert Alschuler's and Stephen
Schulhofer's objections are numerous, but most fall into two catego-
ries. First, plea bargaining undermines structural safeguards by let-
ting prosecutors usurp the neutral judicial role, letting defense
counsel cut corners, and avoiding public trials. 37 One might call this
34 Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975
(1992) (hereinafter Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining]; see also Thomas M. Church,Jr. In Defense
of "Bargain Justice", 13 LAw & Soc'v REV. 509, 513-16 (1979) (arguing that defendants
make rational decisions to plead or go to trial based on the expected sentence after trial
"discounted by the possibility of acquittal"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 308-09 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedure] (arguing that plea bargaining is a desirable mechanism for setting the price of
crime).
35 See Easterbrook, CriminalProcedure, supra note 34, at 317 ("[T]he autonomy value-
the right to waive one's rights as one method of exercising them-[ ] underlies plea bar-
gaining in this country."); Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 1975 (noting that
defendants who plead "get the process over sooner, and solvent ones save the expense of
trial"); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1913-17, 1935-40 (1992) (treating expanded choice as a norm justifying a "presumption
of enforceability" of plea bargains and noting that parties enter plea bargains to exchange
risks).
36 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 35, at 1918-35 (noting the dangers of substantively
unconscionable or unequal outcomes, but arguing that abolishing plea bargains would not
help defendants).
37 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1180, 1306-13; Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the
Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
931, 932-34 (1983) [hereinafter Alschuler, Implementing]; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecu-
tor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHL L. REV. 50, 52-53, 85-105 (1968) [hereinafter Al-
schuler, The Prosecutor's Role]; Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining
(pt. 1), 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1063-67, 1117 (1976) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Trial
Judge's Role]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 49-60 (1988) [hereinafter Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion]; Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987-91 (1992) [hereinafter
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the institutional or adversarial perspective. Second, bargaining un-
dercuts accuracy, equal treatment, fairness, and perceptions of fair-
ness by subverting proof beyond a reasonable doubt and other rights,
thus putting innocent defendants at risk.38 One might call this the
defendants' rights perspective.
To be sure, a few cases and commentators have suggested that
plea bargaining might serve or hinder substantive-criminal-law values.
With the notable exception of one Alschuler article, none of these
discussions of substantive values occupies more than a few pages.39 All
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake-Up Call from the Plea-Bargaining
Trenches, 19 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 135, 136-39 (1994); accord Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful
Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 37, 45-61;
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 12-19 (1978); David
Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 115,
117-26 (1994); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 564, 572-82 (1977).
38 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652,
657-58, 677-80, 719-20 (1981) [hereinafter Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining De-
bate]; Alschuler, Implementing, supra note 37, at 932-34; Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role, supra
note 37, at 72-75, 82-83; Gifford, supra note 37, at 58-65; Langbein, supra note 37, at
12-19; Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion, supra note 37, at 74-77; Schulhofer, Plea Bar-
gaining, supra note 37, at 1981-87; Note, supra note 37, at 573-76; see also Alschuler, The
Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra, at 664-79 (criticizing plea bargaining because it puts
a price on priceless rights and penalizes defendants who reject plea offers out of undue
optimism or poor judgment); Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1197 n.55 (describing bribery
and the perception of bribery in plea bargaining transactions); Michael 0. Finkelstein, A
Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REv. 293, 304, 307,
311-12 (1975) (presenting a statistical analysis finding that prosecutors use deep plea dis-
counts to induce defendants to plead guilty in cases in which they would be unable to
secure convictions at trial because the evidence is too weak).
39 The one exception is Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 38,
at 661-83, 718-20 (arguing that plea bargains produce systematically unjust sentences that
hinge on tactical decisions, do not reflect remorse or promote rehabilitation, and en-
courage defendants to think they have bought and sold priceless human liberty, penologi-
cal objectives, and the right to be heard). The other passing references to substantive
values are found in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (suggesting that the
speed of plea bargaining leads to swifter incapacitation, rehabilitation, and the like); Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (same); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role, supra note
37, at 106-12 (explaining that plea bargaining leads to an irrational and unjust distribu-
tion of sentences, as sometimes prosecutors are tempted to be too lenient and at other
times are too harsh); Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 34, at 309 (claiming that
plea bargaining frees prosecutors to pursue more defendants, leading to more deter-
rence); Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 1975 (same); Gifford, supra note 37,
at 70-73 (noting that guilty pleas keep victims and the public from seeing retribution
meted out and may also undermine rehabilitation); Note, supra note 37, at 572-73 (sug-
gesting that the speed of plea bargaining leads to swifter incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
the like); Albert W. Alschuler, Book Review, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 1007, 1022-23, 1041 (1979)
[hereinafter Alschuler, Book Review] (reviewing CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIO-
LENCE, CRIMINALJUSTICE (1978)) (expressing concern that plea bargains sometimes lead to
unwarranted leniency and commodify justice); cf Stanley A. Cohen & Anthony N. Doob,
Public Attitudes to Plea Bargaining, 32 CRIM. L.Q. 85, 95-97 (1989-90) (discussing an opinion
survey finding that a large majority of Canadians opposes plea bargaining because it leads
to overly lenient outcomes).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
in all, these sporadic references to deterrence, incapacitation, retribu-
tion, and rehabilitation are peripheral to the academic and judicial
debate.
In short, the recent plea bargaining debate illustrates the
proceduralist methodology that pervades criminal procedure. Most
recent considerations of plea bargaining stand or fall on procedural
values of autonomy, accuracy, efficiency, fairness, and perceived fair-
ness. 41 They pay little heed to rehabilitation, reform, education, and
other substantive-criminal-law values. As Part II explains, this
proceduralist approach to pleas in general carries over to Alford and
nolo contendere pleas in particular.
II
THE STATUS QUO ON ALFORD AND NOLO
CONTENDERE PLEAS
The proceduralist approach to plea bargains pervades discussions
of Alford and nolo contendere pleas. Recall that these pleas are the
functional equivalent of guilty pleas, except that defendants do not
admit guilt and, in nolo pleas, are not estopped in later litigation.
Most courts and commentators support these pleas, stressing their ef-
ficiency and the desirability of letting defendants choose to protect
their privacy and dignity. The few who criticize these pleas generally
emphasize the danger that innocent defendants may falsely plead
guilty. This emphasis on choice, efficiency, and accuracy exemplifies
the classic proceduralist justifications for plea bargains discussed
above. Subpart A summarizes the law governing these types of pleas.
Subpart B surveys the generally favorable academic commentary on
these pleas. Finally, subpart C looks at how often defendants use
these pleas, in what kinds of cases, and why. Subpart C also contrasts
academics' generally favorable reaction to these pleas with the skepti-
cism expressed by judges and prosecutors.
A. The Law of Nolo Contendere and Alford Pleas
At common law, a defendant could ask the court to impose a
merciful sentence without confessing guilt and without estopping
40 See Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REx. 1121, 1124
n.9, 1136-43 (1998) (summarizing the reigningjustifications for plea bargaining, most of
which rest on "the systemic goal of preserving resources" and only one of which, "the Eas-
terbrook theory," involves maximizing deterrence and suggesting that objections to plea
bargaining depend on an "adversarial trial model" that prizes fair results, individuality, and
autonomy); see also Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really "Ban" Plea Bargain-
ing?: The Core Concerns of lea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 765-83 (1998) (collect-
ing and responding to the main objections to plea bargaining).
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himself from later pleading not guilty on the same facts. 4 1 This proce-
dure became the formal plea of nolo contendere, under which the
defendant admits guilt for purposes of the present case but creates no
estoppel. 4 2 Today, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow de-
fendants to plead nolo contendere with the permission of the court. 4'3
Most states likewise allow nolo contendere pleas, which are sometimes
called no contest pleas, although many of these states require the
court's consent.
44
41 See, e.g., The Queen v. Templeman, 91 Eng. Rep. 54 (K.B. 1702); see also Hudson v.
United States, 272 U.S. 451, 453-57 (1926) (holding that federal courts may impose
sentences of imprisonment following nolo contendere pleas, and quoting and discussing 2
HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 466 (8th ed. 1824)); William L. Mills, Jr., Note, 30 N.C. L.
REV. 407, 409-10 (1952) (surveying the English common law origins of the plea of nolo
contendere and collecting sources). But see State ex rel. Clark v. Adams, 111 S.E.2d 336, 341
(W. Va. 1959) (stating that courts forbid nolo contendere pleas to capital offenses and are
split on whether to allow them to offenses punishable by imprisonment); JOHN FREDERICK
ARCHBOLD, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 139 (New York, Banks, Gould & Co.
1846) (stating that nolo contendere pleas are available only in misdemeanor cases in which
the defendant "desires to submit to a small fine"); Neil H. Cogan, Enteringjudgment on a
Plea of Nolo Contendere: A Reexamination of North Carolina v. Alford and Some Thoughts on the
Relationship Between Proof and Punishment, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 992, 999-1016 (1975) ("With the
exception of a handftll of cases,judgment on a felony charge was not until 1772, and then
only briefly, entered against an accused who refused to confess .... ).
42 Hudson, 272 U.S. at 455. Many courts give preclusive effect to guilty pleas in later
civil litigation. Others admit guilty pleas into evidence but do not give them preclusive
effect, and at least one court has refused to admit guilty pleas into evidence. The Restate-
ment (Second) ofJudgments is ambivalent about giving preclusive effect to pleas. See generally
David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 28-29,
30-37 & n.30 (1984) (discussing these cases and the Restatement (Second), and analyzing the
problem of preclusion).
43 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2)-(3); C. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING §§ 7.12, 8.06
(1997).
44 Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia permit nolo contendere pleas. See
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. I 1 (a); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 17.1 (a)(1); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.3(a); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1016(3) (West Supp. 2002); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-7-205(1)(c) (2002); CONN. R.
SUPER. CT. § 37-7; DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 11 (a); FLA.
R. CRI5. P. 3.170(a); GA. UNIF. SUPER. Cr. R. 33.1; HAW. R. PENAL P. 11 (a); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/113-4.1 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3208(1) (1995); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 552(4) (West 1981); ME. R. CRIM. P. 11(a); MD. R. CT. 4-242(a); MASS. R.
CRim. P. 12(a); MICH. CT. R. 6.301 (B); Miss. UNIF. CIR. & COUN1N CT. R. 8.04(a) (1); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-12-204 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1819.01 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 174.035(1) (Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.'§ 605:6 (2001); N.M. DIST. Cr. R. CRIM.
P. 5-304(A); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-272(c) (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 513 (1992);
OR. REV. STrAT. § 135.335(1)(c) (2001); PA. R. CRIM. P. 590(A); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P.
11; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-7-2(4) (Michie 1998); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 27.02(5) (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-1(3) (Supp. 2002);
VT. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-254 (Michie 2000); W. VA. R. CRIM. P.
l1 (a) (1); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.06(1) (c) (West 1998); Wvo. R. CRIM. P. 11 (a). South Caro-
lina cases indicate that felony defendants are still entering nolo contendere pleas even
though the South Carolina Supreme Court advised lower courts to refuse such pleas in
felon), cases. See Kibler v. State, 227 S.E.2d 199, 201 (S.C. 1976); see also Deal v. State, 527
S.E.2d 112, 112 (S.C. 2000) (indicating that the defendant entered a nolo contendere plea
to felony possession of contraband by a prisoner); State v. Munsch, 338 S.E.2d 329, 329-30
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The Alford plea gives defendants another way to plead guilty with-
out admitting guilt. In North Carolina v. Alford, Henry Alford was
charged with the capital crime of first-degree murder and "faced...
strong evidence of guilt."4 5 Rather than go to trial, he pleaded guilty
to second-degree murder, a noncapital crime, while protesting his in-
nocence. 46 The U.S. Supreme Court held that defendants may know-
ingly and voluntarily plead guilty even while protesting their
innocence if the judge finds "strong evidence of [the defendant's] ac-
tual guilt."47 In Alford, two witnesses testified that the defendant had
left his house with a gun saying he would kill the victim and had re-
turned saying he had killed the victim. 48 The Court noted that Al-
ford's plea was similar to a plea of nolo contendere. It held that if a
defendant can plead nolo contendere while refusing to admit guilt,
he should also be able to plead guilty while protesting his inno-
cence.4 ' The Court also suggested that Alford's decision to plead was
a reasonable choice to cap his maximum sentence, and therefore the
courts should honor it. 5" Although these pleas are not forbidden by
the Constitution, neither are they required. Because defendants have
no right to plead guilty, judges may refuse to accept Alford pleas and
states may forbid them by statute or rule.5' Most states, however, have
followed suit and permitted Alford pleas (sometimes called best-inter-
ests pleas).5 2
(S.C. 1985) (indicating that the defendant entered a nolo contendere plea to the felony
crime of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature).
45 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1970).
46 See id. at 27-29.
47 See id. at 37-38.
48 Id. at 28.
49 See id. at 36-38.
50 See id. at 37-38.
51 Id, at 38 n.1l.
52 Forty-seven states plus the District of Columbia permit Alford pleas (sometimes
called best-interests pleas). SeeAllison v. State, 495 So. 2d 739, 741 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986);
Wike v. State, 623 P.2d 356, 359 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981); State ex rel. McDougall v. Nastro,
800 P.2d 974, 975 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Harris v. State, 620 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Ark. 1981);
In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 758 n.9 (Cal. 1992) (in bank); People v. Canino, 508 P.2d
1273, 1274-75 (Colo. 1973) (en banc); State v. Amarillo, 503 A.2d 146, 162 & n.17 (Conn.
1986); Robinson v. State, 291 A.2d 279, 281 (Del. 1972); In re Fogel, 728 A.2d 668, 669-70
& n.l (D.C. 1999); Boykin v. Garrison, 658 So. 2d 1090, 1090-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Goodman v. Davis, 287 S.E.2d 26, 30 (Ga. 1982); State v. Smith, 606 P.2d 86, 88-89 (Haw.
1980); Sparrow v. State, 625 P.2d 414, 415 (Idaho 1981); People v. Barker, 415 N.E.2d 404,
410 (II. 1980); State v. Hansen, 344 N.W.2d 725, 727 & n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983); State v.
Dillon, 748 P.2d 856, 859-60 (Kan. 1988); Commonwealth v. Corey, 826 S.W.2d 319, 321
(Ky. 1992); State v. Blanchard, 786 So. 2d 701, 703 (La. 2001); State v. Malo, 577 A.2d 332,
334 (Me. 1990); Banegura v. Taylor, 541 A.2d 969, 971 n.1 (Md. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 891, 892 (Mass. 1987); State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn.
1977); Reynolds v. State, 521 So. 2d 914, 916 (Miss. 1988); Brown v. State, 45 S.W.3d 506,
507-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Cameron, 830 P.2d 1284, 1290 (Mont. 1992); State v.
Rhodes, 445 N.W.2d 622, 624-25 (Neb. 1989); State v. Gomes, 930 P.2d 701, 705 (Nev.
1996); Wellington v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of Corr., 666 A.2d 969, 970 (N.H. 1995); State v.
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Alford and nolo contendere pleas differ in two main ways: First,
nolo contendere pleas avoid estoppel in later civil litigation, while Al-
ford pleas do not. Second, defendants who plead nolo contendere
simply refuse to admit guilt, while defendants making Alford pleas af-
firmatively protest their innocence. By and large, however, Alford is a
new extension of the age-old nolo plea.53 This expansion of the law
three decades ago may be no coincidence; Alford fit well with the mod-
ern liberal emphasis on freedom of contract, autonomy, and in-
formed choice.
B. The Scholarly Literature
Commentators who have considered Alford and nolo contendere
pleas have endorsed them for varying reasons. The most common ar-
gument in favor of them is that they resolve cases efficiently and
cheaply.54 Easterbrook and others support these pleas because they
further the interests of defendants, including innocent defendants,
who want to avoid worse outcomes at trial.55 In other words, these
Hodge, 882 P.2d 1, 3 n.1 (N.M. 1994); People v. Hicks, 608 N.Y.S.2d 543, 543-44 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994); State v. McClure, 185 S.E.2d 693, 696-97 (N.C. 1972); State v. Padgett,
586 N.E.2d 1194, 1197-98 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Ocampo v. State, 778 P.2d 920, 923
(Okla. Crim. App. 1989); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Welch, 501 P.2d 991, 995 (Or. Ct.
App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 315-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State
v. Fontaine, 559 A.2d 622, 624 (R.I. 1989); Gaines v. State, 517 S.E. 2d 439, 440-41 (S.C.
1999); State v. Engelmann, 541 N.W.2d 96, 101 (S.D. 1995); State v. Williams, 851 S.W.2d
828, 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992);Johnson v. State, 478 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Fisk, 682 A.2d 937,
938 (Vt. 1996); Perry v. Commonwealth, 533 S.E. 2d 651, 652 (Va. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Osborne, 684 P.2d 683, 687 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Kennedy v. Frazier, 357 S.E.2d 43, 45
(W. Va. 1987); State v. Garcia, 532 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Wis. 1995); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d
1179, 1181 (Wyo. 1992).
5'1 But see Cogan, supra note 41, at 1016-22 (arguing that because Alford pleas allow
the imposition of substantial punishment without the safeguards of confession or trial, they
go well beyond the tradition of nolo contendere pleas in misdemeanor cases).
54 See, e.g., Edward Lane-Reticker, Nolo Contendere in North Carolina, 34 N.C. L. REV.
280, 291 (1956) (arguing that "the plea of nolo contendere saves times [sic] and has some
tendency to expedite judicial business"); Steven E. Walburn, Should the Military Adopt an
Aford[sic]-7Type Guilty Plea?, 44 A.F. L. REV. 119, 140-44 (1998); Case Note, 39 FORDHAM L.
REV. 773, 780-82 (1971) (praising Alford pleas as facilitating plea bargaining and efficiency,
but cautioning that judges must assure themselves that pleas rest on adequate factual ba-
ses); Patrick W. Healey, Note, The Nature and Consequences of the Plea of Nolo Contendere, 33
NEB. L. REV. 428, 433-34 (1954) (contending that nolo contendere pleas "obviate the ne-
cessity of the more time-consuming procedure" of trial for defendants who seek to avoid
estoppel); AliceJ. Hinshaw, Comment, State v. Cameron: Making the Alford Plea an Effective
Tool in Sex Offense Cases, 55 MONir. L. REV. 281, 302 (1994) (endorsing Alford pleas as effi-
cient and fair but calling for revision in the area of sex-offense cases); CurtisJ. Shipley,
Note, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal Defendant, 72 IowA L.
REV. 1063, 1072-74, 1086, 1089 (1987).
55 Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 34, at 320; Walburn, supra note 54, at
143-44, 160-61; Healey, supra note 54, at 434 (suggesting with approval that "a defendant,
even though innocent, might desire to plead nolo contendere rather than undergo the bur-
dens and expense of trial"); Shipley, supra note 54, at 1073, 1089.
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pleas promote autonomy by giving defendants a choice that may bene-
fit their interests. Others contend that these pleas protect defendants'
dignity, privacy, and autonomy by obviating humiliating public admis-
sions of guilt.5 6 Still others argue that nolo pleas protect "the respect-
able citizen" who is "technically guilty" but does not deserve such civil
disabilities as losing the rights to vote and hold office. 57 Finally, some
commentators claim that Alford pleas foster openness between lawyer
and client. Without Alford pleas, they claim, innocent defendants
would lie to their lawyers about their guilt in order to reap the bene-
fits of pleading guilty.58
Even Alschuler, who would prefer to abolish plea bargaining alto-
gether, reluctantly endorses Alford pleas. 5 1 He argues that the Alford
plea can be a necessary psychological "crutch '6  when defendants,
against their best interests, refuse to admit guilt because of psychologi-
cal obstacles, egos, and shame.' Even innocent defendants, he ar-
gues, should be able to choose Alford pleas if they decide that pleading
is in their best interests. 62 Alschuler further claims that if lawyers and
judges insist on admissions of guilt, defendants will lie to their lawyers
and the court, and defense counsel will pressure clients to confess or
lie. 63 He argues that Alford pleas, though distasteful and offensive, are
more honest and fair and less hypocritical. They keep defendants
from having to lie, prevent defense lawyers from coercing confessions,
and avoid forcing defendants into disadvantageous trials.6 4
The few opponents of Alford criticize the plea primarily on
proceduralist grounds. For example,John Langbein and others argue
that Alford pleas undercut proof beyond a reasonable doubt and allow
innocent defendants to plead guilty.65 Still others object that Alford
56 See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 532 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Wis. 1995) (endorsing Alford pleas as
a way to allow defendants accused of shameful crimes to "avoid ridicule and embarrass-
ment"). One might question whether these pleas are in fact more dignified, because many
in the public may perceive them to be dishonest and manipulative. See infra Part IlI.B.
Nonetheless, the important point is that some offenders view these pleas as fig leaves that
avert shame and embarrassment. See infra Part II.C.
57 Mills, supra note 41, at 416-17.
58 See, e.g., Walburn, supra note 54, at 143-44; Shipley, supra note 54, at 1074, 1086,
1089.
59 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1292, 1296-97.
60 Id. at 1304.
61 See id. at 1280, 1287, 1304.
62 See id. at 1296-98.
63 Id. at 1297. He notes that even after Alford, many defense lawyers and judges refuse
to permit such pleas. See id. at 1298-1304. It may seem odd or even troubling that defense
lawyers refuse to enter certain pleas, as Alschuler found in many interviews with defense
lawyers. See id. at 1299-1300. As my findings in Part II.C show, however, defense attorneys
now favor both Alford and nolo contendere pleas.
(4 See id. at 1296-98, 1306.
65 See Gifford, supra note 37, at 59-60; Stephen E. Henderson, Hilacked from Both
Sides-Why Religious Extremists and Religious Bigots Share an Interest in Preventing Academic Dis-
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pleas risk being involuntary because coercive pressures are likely to
convince reluctant defendants to plead.6 6 David Wexler and Bruce
Winick, however, criticize Alford pleas because they allow sex offenders
to remain in denial. They argue that judges should refuse to accept
these pleas, thus forcing defense lawyers to confront their clients with
the facts and break down their clients' illusions and denials.67
C. Who Uses These Pleas, When, and Why?
A 1997 survey of inmates in state and federal correction facilities
provides some statistical evidence that defendants frequently use nolo
contendere and Alford pleas.68 The survey reports that approximately
2% of federal defendants pleaded nolo contendere and 3% entered
Alford pleas. 69 In state courts, the numbers were significantly higher.
Approximately 11% of state defendants pleaded nolo contendere and
6.5% entered Alford pleas.7T
Although this survey did not analyze pleas by the type of crime,
other statistics do break down federal nolo pleas by type of crime. In
the year ending September 30, 2000, 0.5% of all federal defendants
pleaded nolo contendere. 7' These pleas tended to cluster in certain
categories of cases. For example, 6% of those charged with drunk
driving and other traffic offenses pleaded nolo contendere. 72 Nolo
contendere pleas were also more likely in white-collar crimes such as
course on Criminal Jurisprudence Based on the First Principles of Christianity, 37 IDAHO L. REV.
103, 122-23 (2000); Cogan, supra note 41, at 1016-22 (objecting that Alfordpleas undercut
the level of certainty that the common law has historically required before imposing felony
punishments); Langbein, supra note 37, at 15-16; see also Recent Development, North Car-
olina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), 32 OIO ST. L.J. 426, 433, 438-40 (1971) (criticizing
Alford as undercutting safeguards for innocent defendants and leading to more pressure to
plead and longer sentences for those who do not plead).
66 See, e.g., TimothyJ. Simmons, Note, 49 N.C. L. REV. 795, 800-801 (1971).
67 Wexler and Winick focus on rehabilitation of offenders, but they do not discuss
other substantive values or the effect of these pleas on victims or the public. SeeJeffrey A.
Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through Law: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to Sex
Offenders and the Plea Process, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 579, 584-85 (1992) (coauthored
by David Wexler); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 279, 285-87 (1993), reprinted in LAw IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY 157-70 (David
B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); David B. Wexler & Bruce]. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL & Pt-iVsicAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 225, 229 (1992) (reproducing substantial portions of Wexler, supra, at 285-87); Bruce
J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A TherapeuticJurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL'v, & L. 505, 541 (1998).
68 CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIM-
INAL CASES 8 tbl.17 (2000), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 2000, at app. tbl.D-4 (2001), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/appendices/
d04sep00.pdf.
72 Id.
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fraud, counterfeiting, food and drug, and environmental laws. 7-3
Roughly 5% of defendants charged with federal sex offenses pleaded
nolo contendere.74 Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that nolo
contendere pleas are popular in antitrust cases.75
Of course, federal numbers risk being unrepresentative because
most cases and types of crimes are handled primarily at the state level.
Because no state statistics break down Alford and nolo pleas by type of
crime, I conducted a series of Westlaw searches for cases involving
these pleas. I found more than 18,500 cases involving nolo con-
tendere pleas. Of the relevant search results in a random sample,
26% involved drug crimes, 25% involved property crimes (including
embezzlements), 23% involved violent crimes, 21% involved sex
crimes, and 14% involved white-collar crimes. 76 A similar search
yielded almost 2,500 cases that involved Alford pleas. Of the relevant
search results in a random sample, 27% of Alford pleas involved sex
offenses, 27% involved other violent offenses, and 12% involved
white-collar offenses. 77
7 Id.
74 Id. Note, however, that the sample size is quite small because so few sex offenses
are federal crimes. One must be cautious about generalizing based on a sample of 4 out of
812 defendants whose cases were not dismissed.
75 See STUART L. HILLS, CRIME, POWER, AND MORALITY: THE CRIMINAL-LAW PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 175 (1971).
76 Between February 12 and March 1, 2002, my research assistant ran the query
"OP(PLE! /S "NOLO CONTENDERE" "NO CONTEST")" through the Westlaw databases
containing the complete case law of the federal courts and each state and arrived at the
results described in the test. It was necessary to break these searches down by state and in
some cases by time period, so that the 400-result cap that Westlaw applies to each search
would not interfere with an accurate count. The searches found 29,382 state cases and
4,344 federal cases that discussed nolo contendere pleas. Spot checks of 220 randomly
chosen results confirmed that a majority (121, or 55%) involved defendants who had them-
selves entered nolo contendere pleas, as opposed to cases that merely discussed nolo con-
tendere pleas in the abstract. 29,382 times 0.55 yields about 16,160 relevant state cases,
and 4,344 times 0.55 yields about 2,389 relevant federal cases. These figures may well un-
derestimate the number of nolo contendere pleas, as many will not show up in reported
appellate case law because the defendant has waived the right to appeal and never brings
an appeal or collateral attack. On the other hand, these numbers may double- or triple-
count cases that result in multiple decisions by different courts. Note that the figures in
the text add tip to more than 100% because some cases involved nolo contendere pleas to
multiple types of charges.
77 Between February 12 and 28, 2002, and again on April 22, 2002, my research assis-
tant ran the query "ALFORD /15 PLE!" through the Westlaw databases containing the
complete case law of the federal courts and of each state and arrived at the results de-
scribed in the text. It was necessary to break these searches down by state so that the 400-
result cap that Westlaw applies to each search would not interfere with an accurate count.
The searches returned 2,717 state cases and 757 federal cases. Spot checks of 581 state and
federal cases confirmed that 60% of the search results involved defendants who had en-
tered Alford pleas, as opposed to more abstract discussions of these pleas. 2717 times 0.60
yields 1884, and 757 times 0.60 yields 586. The percentages in the text were drawn from a
random sample of 757 relevant search results from the February search; it is coincidental
that this 757 happens to be the same number of search results from the federal search.
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To get a sense of when and why lawyers and defendants use these
pleas, I interviewed thirty-four veteran prosecutors, judges, and public
and private defense lawyers. 78 I used Westlaw searches to pick states
that appear to use Alford or nolo pleas frequently (Louisiana, Michi-
gan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Ohio) and interviewed attorneys and
judges in those states. I contrasted these states with states that forbid
both kinds of pleas (Indiana and NewJersey). I followed no scientific
method, and of course my sample size was far too small to generate
statistically significant results. My methodology was journalistic and
impressionistic; it replicated on a much smaller scale the surveys on
which Alschuler built his famous articles on plea bargaining. 79
According to the defense lawyers I interviewed, many if not most
defendants are initially reluctant to admit guilt. Defense counsel work
with defendants, confront them with the evidence, and bring most
around to where they will admit guilt. A small minority of clients re-
mains unwilling to admit guilt even when it would be in their interests
to do so. Some go to trial, but others enter Alford or nolo pleas. Law-
yers estimated that a small percentage of cases is resolved by one of
these pleas.
When I asked defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges why they
thought these defendants would not admit guilt, their answers tended
to converge. The most common barrier to a classic guilty plea is the
defendant's fear of embarrassment and shame before family and
friends. Defense lawyers work hard to reduce the shame of pleading
and to convince families that their family member should plead. One
defense lawyer even schedules pleas for late Friday afternoons and
misleads clients' families about plea dates, so that his clients can plead
more easily in empty courtrooms. Even these shame-reducing mea-
sures, however, are not enough for some defendants.
These figures probably underestimate the numbers of Alford pleas, as many will not show
up in reported appellate case law because the defendant has waived the right to appeal and
never brings an appeal or collateral attack. On the other hand, these numbers may
double- or triple-count cases that result in multiple decisions by different courts.
78 All notes from these interviews are on file with the author.
79 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1181 & n.8; Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role, supra
note 37, at 52 & n.15; Alschuler, The TrialJudge's Role, supra note 37, at 1060-61 & n.10. As
Alschuler correctly notes, this impressionistic method can be valuable:
Even unverified gossip may be valuable, however, when it "makes sense"-
when reflection indicates that our current system of criminal justice would
inevitably lead to behavior of the sort described in more than a few cases.
Moreover, the hearsay tends to become credible when similar observations
are reported by persons with different and opposing roles in the criminal
justice system and by persons in independent jurisdictions across the
nation.
Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1181. This methodology is useful where, as here, better sources
of data simply do not exist.
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After shame, the reason cited most frequently for defendants' re-
fusal to admit guilt is psychological denial, in which defendants refuse
to admit guilt to themselves. Some lawyers also mentioned collateral
consequences. For example, an admission of guilt may hurt in a later
child-custody battle. Admissions may also scare off prospective em-
ployers, whereas Alford and nolo contendere pleas make it easier to
reassure employers by denying guilt. Furthermore, nolo pleas avert
estoppel in collateral civil litigation, especially in automobile acci-
dents. Finally, defendants may use nolo and Alford pleas because they
were intoxicated and unable to remember the facts. Several lawyers
opined, however, that most claims of lost memory or fear of collateral
consequences are fig leaves to justify these pleas. 80 The true reason is
more often feelings of shame or guilt.
Almost all interviewees agreed that innocent defendants use
these pleas infrequently. Their descriptions ranged from "occasion-
ally" to "extremely uncommon" to "[in] significant" to "very rare." ''
For example, one longtime public defender estimated that he had
seen no more than five to ten innocent defendants use these pleas
over the last sixteen years. A few defense lawyers did suggest that
some defendants enter Alford or nolo pleas to crimes more serious
than the ones they committed.82
Opinions differed on the kinds of cases in which defendants use
these pleas. A few interviewees said that they could not generalize
because they use Alford and nolo contendere pleas in a variety of cases.
But most interviewees thought certain kinds of cases were most likely
to involve Alford and nolo pleas. By far the largest category of cases is
sex offenses. Sex offenders are often in denial and fear shame, rejec-
tion by families and girlfriends, and violence by other prisoners.83 A
second category is crimes against children or the elderly, especially
sex crimes. These include child molestation, incest, and rape, but also
8) One longtime public defender, for example, recounted a no-contest plea in a gun-
possession case in which the defendant recited a fear of civil litigation, even though it was
impossible to see any civil litigation that could have arisen out of the facts.
81 One defense lawyer opined that innocent defendants are more likely to use classic
guilty pleas than Alford or nolo contendere pleas. He reasoned that innocent defendants
will plead guilty only when they receive an offer too good to refuse, that is, a massive
sentencing discount, and prosecutors will offer such large discounts only in exchange for
clear admissions of guilt. Another defense lawyer, in a state that forbids Alford and nolo
contendere pleas, said that he saw a significant number of drug offenders whom he
thought were innocent enter classic guilty pleas to earn massive sentence discounts.
82 Those whom I interviewed were divided on whether judges and prosecutors re-
warded Alford and nolo contendere pleas with sentence discounts as large as those given
for classic guilty pleas. A majority thought they were equivalent.
83 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1280, 1286 n.290; Wexler & Winick, note 67, at 229;
see also In re Guilty Plea Cases, 235 N.W.2d 132, 147 (Mich. 1975) (holding that reluctance
to admit to "a particularly sordid crime," such as sexual assault of a child, is an adequate
reason to accept a nolo contendere plea).
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nonsexual child abuse and neglect. Other interviewees mentioned
heinous murders, domestic assaults, batteries, crimes of dishonesty,
drunk driving, drugs, and auto accidents (to avoid estoppel in tort
suits).
Every defense lawyer whom I interviewed approved of these pleas.
They use them as a last resort, a tool for difficult defendants who sim-
ply will not admit guilt. Defense lawyers reported that most but not all
prosecutors are amenable to Alford and nolo pleas, but that judges
vary widely and many will not accept them.84 In other words, prosecu-
tors and judges are more ambivalent. On the one hand, many see
these pleas as efficient ways to dispose of cases and reduce staggering
dockets, a top priority. On the other hand, they fear that pleas with-
out admissions of guilt are more vulnerable to appeal or collateral
attack, thus undercutting finality. In addition, some prosecutors and
especially judges dislike the message that these pleas send. Some
judges view criminal justice as a morality play in which defendants
should confess and apologize so that victims see justice done and can
begin to heal. On this view, pleas without confessions leave victims
frustrated and defendants defiant and resistant to treatment. Two de-
fense lawyers suggested that victims or their families sometimes press
prosecutors to oppose Alford pleas because they want admissions of
guilt and apologies. Moreover, some prosecutors and judges worry
that pleas by defendants who deny guilt or equivocate undermine
public confidence. For example, defendants may deny guilt out of
court (the Sara Jane Olson maneuver) ,85 leading family, friends, and
the public to suspect injustice. As one judge put it, unequivocal pleas
and trials "support[ ] public trust in the institutions" by impeding
later denials. In short, prosecutors and judges sometimes oppose Al-
ford and nolo pleas on consequentialist and other moral grounds.
What happens when the law forbids Alford and nolo pleas, judges
refuse to allow them, or prosecutors refuse to enter them? Some of
these cases go to trial, but many defendants eventually admit guilt, as
Olson did.86 Judges and counsel in states that forbid these pleas
agreed that a majority of defendants who deny guilt at plea hearings
eventually admit guilt when the only other option is to go to trial.8 7
84 Alford and nolo pleas often require judges' consent, as well as prosecutors' consent
if the pleas are part of plea bargains. See sources cited supra notes 44, 52.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 16-30.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 16-30.
87 See William Schma, Judgingfor the New Millennium, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 4, 5
(stating that after a judge started refusing to accept nolo pleas in felony sex cases, defense
lawyers advised offenders to plead guilty, these defendants all went forward with guilty
pleas, the judge was better able to confront defendants with their conduct at sentencing,
defendants' families were better able to accept guilt, and victims felt better).
Statistics, though not definitive, suggest that rejection of these pleas does not create a
huge number of trials. A National Center for State Courts report collected criminal case-
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One judge estimated that although he has balked at no-contest pleas
for ten years, only one or two defendants have gone to trial rather
than admit guilt. For example, when ajudge refused to let two prosti-
tution defendants plead nolo contendere, they pleaded guilty a few
minutes later. In another case, when a judge refused to accept the
guilty plea of a prostitute's customer who refused to admit guilt, the
defense lawyer conferred with his client, who later admitted guilt.
Other evidence corroborates my finding that prosecutors and
judges are deeply ambivalent about Alford and nolo contendere pleas.
For example, even though federal law permits Alford pleas, U.S. De-
partment of Justice policy discourages them.8 Because the public
may not understand how a defendant who claims innocence can plead
guilty, it may suspect prosecutorial overreaching.8 9 Thus, federal
prosecutors may not agree to Alford pleas absent Department of Jus-
tice approval111 If defendants try to enter Alford pleas to fewer than all
counts without prosecutorial approval, federal prosecutors must dis-
courage them by refusing to dismiss the remaining counts.9 1 Indeed,
the Antitrust and Tax Divisions go further and oppose all Alford and
nolo contendere pleas.t 2 The Tax Division's explanation is that such
pleas undercut collateral estoppel and mislead the public into think-
ing that the government's case is weak.93 Other prosecutors likewise
processing statistics for twenty-two states in the year 2000. It found that ol average 3.3% of
cases were resolved at trial, 57.2% were resolved by pleas, 23.3% were resolved by dismissals
or nole prosequis, and 16.2% had other unspecified dispositions. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2001, at 63 (2001), available at http://
www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2001-Files/2001_FrontMatter.pdf. The two juris-
dictions that forbid Alford and nolo contendere pleas had comparable figures, with trial
rates only slightly higher than average. In NewJersey, 3.9% of criminal cases went to trial,
68.4% pleaded, 15.2% were dismissed or nollext, and 12.4% had other dispositions. In Indi-
ana, 4.3% of criminal cases went to trial, 57.3% pleaded, 35.5% were dismissed or nolled,
and 3.0% had other dispositions. Id.
88 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICEE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION Uuly 1980), excerpted in
6 FEI. SENrENCING REP. 317, 328-29 (1994).
89 Id. at 328.
9() Id.
9 Id. at 329.
92 Ner Grand Juy Manual Takes Hard Line, THE D.O.J. ALERT, May 1992, WL 5 DOJ
ALERT 2, at *6; Gerald A. Feffer, Criminal Tax Investigations, A.Ll-A.B.A., Feb. 18, 1988,
WL C254 ALI-ABI, at *31.
Perhaps these central policies are high-level efforLs to send public messages and en-
force consistency by riding herd on line prosecutors. Line prosecutors are tempted to
lighten their own workloads by using every tool available to secure pleas, because the long-
term impact of any one plea is slight. In contrast, high-level policymakers are more likely
to consider systemic, long-term ramifications.
93 Feffer, supra note 92, at *31.
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disfavor Alford and nolo pleas. 94 Nevertheless, defendants may be able
to enter Alford and nolo pleas over the government's objections. 95
Several state courts have followed suit and forbidden Alford pleas.
For example, the Supreme Court of Indiana has held that judges may
not accept guilty pleas accompanied by protestations of innocence.9"3
The court suggested that Alford pleas risk being unintelligent, involun-
tary, and inaccurate. 97 The Indiana court also argued that Alford pleas
undercut public respect for the justice system. 98 Michigan and New
Jersey courts agree and also forbid Alford pleas. 99 Arizona permits Al-
ford pleas but disfavors them for fear that innocent defendants will
plead guilty or that the public will lose confidence in the justice sys-
tem. 1110 Individual judges in other states disfavor Alford pleas as
well. 1" Finally, Alschuler found, contrary to my findings, that many
defense lawyers refuse to allow clients to plead guilty if they claim
innocence. 102
This reluctance to accept speedy Alford and nolo contendere
pleas suggests that they are deeply troubling. Though these pleas are
efficient, they disregard other important values-both procedural val-
ues such as accuracy and substantive values such as reform, education,
and expressive condemnation. Parts III and IV develop these argu-
ments further.
94 See HERMAN, supra note 43, §§ 7.12, 8.05, 8.06.
95 Id. § 7.12, at 119; see also HILLS, supra note 75, at 175 (stating that between 1959 and
1965, in 96% of cases in which the Antitrust Division opposed nolo pleas, judges nonethe-
less accepted them).
96 Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983); Harshman v. State, 115 N.E.2d 501,
502 (Ind. 1953).
97 See Ross, 456 N.E.2d at 422-23 (suggesting that Alford pleas risk not being "'intelli-
gently and understandingly made, or [may be] inconsistent with the realities of the situa-
tion"' (quoting Harshman, 115 N.E.2d at 502)).
98 Trueblood v. State, 587 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ind. 1992), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Trueblood v. Davis, 301 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2002).
99 See Micii. CT. R. 6.302(A), (D) (1) (requiring a court to establish the accuracy of a
guilty plea "by questioning the defendant [in order to] support ... a finding that the
defendant is guilty of the offense charged or the offense to which the defendant is plead-
ing"); Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety v. Gonzales, 641 A.2d 1060, 1063 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1994) ("NewJersey... does not permit the entry of such a plea, commonly referred to
as an Alford plea."); State v. Korzenowski, 303 A.2d 596, 597 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1973) ("'[N]otwithstanding the recent decision in [North Carolina v. Alford], except in capi-
tal cases, a plea shall not be accepted from a defendant who does not admit commission of
the offense."' (quoting a New Jersey Supreme Court directive to assignment judges and
county prosecutors)).
100 Washington v. Superior Court, 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Duran v.
Superior Court, 782 P.2d 324, 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
101 See, e.g., Constantopoulos v. Warden, No. CV-921439S, 1996 WL 409228, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 1, 1996) (holding that trial counsel's failure to enter an Alford plea
was not grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel because "trial counsel knew the trial
judge looked with disfavor on them and would probably not have accepted it").
102 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1297-1300.
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III
AccuRACY AND PERCEIVED AccuRAcY
Efficiency is a value in criminal procedure, but it is not the only
nor even the most important value. More important is the system's
accuracy, and in particular its accuracy in freeing innocent defend-
ants. Although our system goes to great lengths to protect innocent
defendants at trial, it perversely makes it too easy for them to plead
guilty by allowing Alford and nolo contendere pleas. Innocent defend-
ants whose scruples might otherwise prevent them from pleading
guilty can use these pleas. Even if innocent defendants want to plead
guilty, the law should not go out of its way to promote these unjust
results.
This Part argues that Alford and nolo pleas disserve the conven-
tional procedural values of accuracy and perceived accuracy. Subpart
A rebuts the arguments of Alschuler, Easterbrook, and others and
contends that allowing innocent defendants to plead is wrong. Be-
cause innocent defendants who plead often overestimate the likeli-
hood of their conviction at trial, the law should encourage them to
persevere and win acquittals. Moreover, Easterbrook's utilitarianism
ignores the moral imperative to avoid knowingly facilitating injustice.
Subpart B considers how Alford and nolo contendere pleas undermine
public perceptions of the justice system's accuracy and fairness. Part
IV then goes beyond Part III's proceduralist approach and explains
how these pleas violate important values of the substantive criminal
law.
A. Convicting Innocent Defendants Is Wrong
It should go without saying that it is wrong to convict innocent
defendants. Thus, the law should hinder these convictions instead of
facilitating them through Alford and nolo contendere pleas. Nonethe-
less, Easterbrook, Alschuler, and others favor Alford and nolo pleas in
part because they enable innocent defendants to plead guilty without
lying. '" Some of these commentators, notably Easterbrook, assume
that increasing the range and ease of choices is always good. 1 04 But
increasing the ease of convicting innocent defendants is a vice, not a
virtue. If the law made it harder for innocent defendants to plead
guilty, it would minimize both actual and perceived injustices. 1°5
103 See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
104 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
105 The supporters of Alford pleas note two competing possibilities. On one hand, they
claim that if Alford pleas were abolished, many innocent defendants would falsely confess
and plead guilty anyway. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1286-87, 1306; Walburn,
supra note 54, at 143; Shipley, supra note 54, at 1073-74, 1086. On the other hand, they
note that both guilty and innocent defendants may have significant psychological barriers
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Easterbrook contends that innocent defendants will plead guilty
only when the expected sentence at trial, discounted by the
probability of acquittal, is greater than the plea terms offered.'0 6 De-
fendants who are advised by competent counsel and have private
knowledge of the facts will be in a good position to assess their own
chances at trial.10 7 Because trials are imperfect and sometimes convict
innocent defendants, innocent defendants benefit by having the op-
tion of pleading guilty whenever they might be convicted at trial.",,
As Alschuler puts it, "both courts and defense attorneys should recog-
nize a 'right' of the innocent to plead guilty. So long as a defendant
has something to gain by entering a plea agreement, it is unfair to
deny him the choice."' 10 9
Easterbrook's argument mistakenly treats innocent defendants as
fully informed, autonomous, rational actors. Many defendants, how-
ever, receive poor advice from overburdened appointed counsel of
varying quality whose caseloads and incentives lead them to press cli-
ents to plead guilty.' 10 In addition, criminal discovery is not nearly as
to confession, and predict that abolition of Alford pleas would slow down the system and
lead to more trials. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1287, 1304 (psychological barri-
ers); Walburn, supra note 54, at 141 (efficiency and increased trials); Shipley, supra note
54, at 1073, 1086 (same).
These two forces are in tension. To the extent that innocent defendants are reluctant
to confess falsely, Alford and nolo contendere pleas make it significantly easier for them to
plead guilty. Removing these options would encourage innocent defendants to go to trial.
If, as seems plausible, only a tiny percentage of those charged with crimes are innocent,
then the increase in trials of innocent defendants would be relatively minor. If there were
no Alford or nolo contendere pleas, some innocent defendants would still be tempted to
confess falsely and plead guilty to earn large sentencing discounts, but others would be
more likely to go to trial.
106 See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 34, at 311-12.
107 See id. at 309-10.
108 Id. at 320; see also Church, supra note 34, at 513-15 (discussing the benefits of plea
bargains in general); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 35, at 1913-17, 1936-40, 1949-51 (arguing
that even innocent defendants may find it in their interests to plead guilty and reap the
benefits of certainty and reduced sentences, but noting that limits on discovery may hinder
defendants' assessments of the likelihood of conviction).
109 Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1296.
110 See id. at 1248-70; Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion, supra note 37, at 53-56; see
also State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1156 & n.13 (Okla. 1990) (holding that $3200 statutory
cap on attorneys' fees inadequately compensates counsels who go to trial for the extra time
and overhead required); Alison Frankel, Too Independent, AM. LAw., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 67,
72 (quoting a public defender's explanation of why some innocent defendants plead
guilty: "[W]e don't have enough resources and ... the system is geared toward putting
people away as efficiently as possible." (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf Alschuler,
supra note 10, at 1182-86, 1198-1206 (analyzing the motives of non-appointed defense
counsel).
Poor counsel would also hinder these same defendants at trial. But the financial in-
centives to encourage pleas would not affect trials as much because of the large fixed costs
involved, and furthermore, lawyers' desires to preserve their reputations by prevailing at
trial would counteract financial incentives to cut corners. See Schulhofer, Criminal Justice
Discretion, supra note 37, at 56-59.
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extensive as civil discovery, which hampers defendants' accurate as-
sessments of their prospects at trial.1 I Thus, innocent defendants
who want to enter Alford or nolo pleas are likely overestimating their
risk of conviction at trial. 112 Innocent defendants may also plead
guilty because of pressure or misinformation; thus their pleas may not
be fully intelligent and voluntary. 13 Defendants poor enough to qual-
ify for overburdened appointed counsel and those of low intelligence
are most likely to make these mistakes. The result may well be troub-
ling disparities based on wealth, mental capacity, and education. The
law should instead encourage these innocent defendants to go to
trial. 114
There is also a deeper moral objection to Easterbrook's purely
utilitarian argument. One should recoil at the thought of convicting
innocent defendants. It is all the more troubling to trumpet this fact
as an advantage. Not all of ethics is reducible to a consequentialist
calculus. There is something profoundly troubling about knowingly
facilitating injustice, more so than inadvertently allowing it to happen.
No promise of good consequences can erase the repugnance of pro-
moting an evil in the hope of averting a worse evil. To use Dostoyev-
sky's example, no hope of good consequences can justify society's
murdering a single innocent child. 1 5 Kant would agree that society
cannot knowingly facilitate the punishment of those who do not de-
serve it, even if they agree to it. 16
The criminal justice system probably does not charge and prose-
cute many innocent defendants. Some innocent defendants do ex-
111 See Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion, supra note 37, at 78-79.
112 See Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining, supra note 37, at 1981-82.
113 See Alschnler, supra note 10, at 1191-98, 1287-89 (describing the ways in which
defense lawyers whom Alschuler interviewed used lies, misrepresentations, interrogation,
cajolery, and psychological pressure "'almost to the point of coercion'" to procure confes-
sions and guilty pleas) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114 The counterargument is that poor counsel would harm innocent defendants just as
much at trial as in plea bargaining. But, as Schulhofer notes, the incentive and ability to
cut corners in low-visibility plea bargaining is much greater than in high-visibility trials, in
which the lawyer's reputation is on the line. See supra note 110.
115 See FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 245 (North Point Press, Rich-
ard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., 1990) (1880).
116 Put another way, if innocent defendants were fully informed, could accurately de-
termine the likelihood of conviction and punishment at trial, and would rationally prefer
short but certain sentences to the risk of long sentences after trial, a pure utilitarian like
Easterbrook would favor allowing them to plead guilty. See supra text accompanying notes
106, 108. A nonconsequentialist, however, would still object that society must not con-
sciously promote guilty and nolo contendere pleas by innocent defendants. Unless one
"has committed a crime" and been found guilty and punishable, no amount of benefits can
justify punishment. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans., T. &
T. Clark 1887) (1796-1797) [hereinafter KANT, PHILOSOPHY]; IMMANUEL KANT, THF META-
PHYSICS OF MORALS *331-*32 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) [hereinafter KANT, META-
PHYSICS]. Even though the courts may accidentally punish some innocent defendants, the
state has no right to consciously facilitate this injustice.
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ist' l7 however, and may be tempted to use Alford and nolo pleas
instead of going to trial. Though it is impossible to know how many
defendants are innocent, many of the lawyers whom I interviewed
thought that innocent defendants occasionally used these pleas. An-
ecdotal evidence also indicates that innocent defendants use these
pleas. For example, in the notorious Wenatchee case, twelve defend-
ants entered Alford or nolo contendere pleas to child molestation-re-
lated charges." I8 Two of them later adduced evidence that a
complaining child had never been abused but had falsely incrimi-
nated them because of coercive police interrogation.1 19 After the
child recanted, these two defendants were eventually allowed to with-
draw their pleas. 120 Extensive media coverage later suggested that the
117 See generally BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000) (describing in detail cases of
wrongly convicted defendants).
118 See Everett v. Perez, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1135 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (noting that
Harold and Idella Everett entered Alford guilty pleas to the charges of sexual abuse); Mike
Barber, Another Child Sex-Ring Defendant Freed, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 29, 1999,
at C9 (stating that Randall Reed entered an Alford plea but later pleaded guilty to assault
in exchange for immediate release and dropping a challenge to his conviction); Facsimile
from Pat Atkins, Chelan County Clerk's Office, to Keith Vaughn and Stephanos Bibas
(Sept. 4, 2002) (on file with author) (confirming that Randall Reed, Lawrence Catcheway,
Sid Holt, Barbara "Barb" Garass, and Donna Hidalgo entered Alford pleas). A number of
these pleas were used by prosecutors to extract lesser convictions in exchange for immedi-
ate release from prison after earlier child-molestation convictions were reversed on appeal.
See, e.g.,Judge Frees Two Defendants from Sex Ring Cases, SEA'-rLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 16,
1999, at BI (stating thatJeannie Bendt and Laura Holt entered Alford pleas to child moles-
tation, were sentenced to time served, and were released in exchange for dropping their
appeals); Plea Ends Older Wenatchee Case, SEATTLE POST-INTELLICENCER, Dec. 3, 1999, at D6
(stating that Cherie Town entered an Alford plea to child molestation and was released
immediately in exchange for dropping her appeal of her original molestation convictions);
Two Wenatchee Sex-Abuse Defendants Released, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 8, 2000, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/wenaww.shtml (last visited June 7, 2002)) (Meredith
"Gene" Town and Lawrence D. "Leo" Catcheway entered Alford pleas to violating a protec-
tive order and assatlt with sexual intent, respectively, in exchange for vacatur of their ear-
lier convictions and sentences and release from prison); Wenatchee Woman Convicted in Sex-
Abuse Case Is Freed, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 5, 1998, at Al (Linda Miller entered
a no-contest plea to lesser charges of communicating with a minor for immoral purposes in
exchange for dismissal of molestation charges that she had been convicted of but which
had been reversed on appeal).
119 See Everett, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-36; Justice in Wenatchee, but Still a Long Way to Go,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 21, 1998, at B4.
120 Everett, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-36. Another example of an Alford plea by an inno-
cent man occurred in Virginia. Police officers used abusive interrogation techniques to
pressure a developmentally disabled man, David Vasquez, to confess to murder; he eventu-
ally entered an Alford plea on the advice of his lawyer. Investigators later concluded that
the crime fit the modus operandi of a convicted serial killer, and prosecutors persuaded the
Governor to pardon Vasquez. Brooke A. Masters, Lucky Release from a Life Behind Bars: Va.
Man Served 5 Years-Under Plea Agreement-Before Real Murderer Was Found, WASH. POST, Apr.
28, 2000, at A23.
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police investigator had led children to fabricate these and thousands
of other allegations of sexual abuse. 121
B. Public Perceptions of the Justice System
The justice system must consider not only what the parties want,
but also public perceptions of accuracy and fairness. As Schulhofer
points out, justice and punishment are classic public goods. 12 2 Al-
lowing innocent defendants to plead guilty creates "serious negative
externalities"' 123 because society has a strong interest in ensuring that
criminal convictions are both just and perceived as just. Though one
lawyer whom I interviewed cynically suggested that criminal justice is
not and should not be about the truth, the public cares a great deal
about truth.
Alschuler, however, turns this concern for public perceptions on
its head. He praises Alford pleas as an honest way to avoid hypocrisy
instead of tempting innocent defendants to confess falsely. 124 But Al-
schuler's own evidence shows that many lawyers and judges are deeply
uncomfortable with this prospect. 12 5 The public may be even more
uncomfortable, as Alschuler recognizes when he characterizes refusals
to accept Alford pleas as a "public relations measure."' 2 1 Alford and
nolo contendere pleas send mixed messages, breeding public doubt,
uncertainty, and lack of respect for the criminal justice system. Far
from encouraging honesty, they let guilty defendants cloak their pleas
121 See, e.g., Mike Barber, Wenatchee Haunted by Investigations, SEA-rrLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCE'R, Sept. 10, 1999, at B1; Dorothy Rabinowitz, Reckoning in Wenatchee, WAi ST. J.,
Sept. 21, 1999, at A26; Paul Craig Roberts, Saved by Pursuit of the Truth, WAsi-. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2000, at Al 6 ("The 1994-95 child sex abuse witch-hunt in Wenatchee, Wash., resulted in a
massive frame-up."); see also Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1063 & n.36 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting that Wenatchee prosecutors filed 29,727 charges of child sex abuse against 43
adults, few of which held tip in court, and that most of the cases rested on a government
witness's implausible tale of orgies).
122 Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining, supra note 37, at 1985.
123 Id.
124 See Alschuler, .iitpa note 10, at 1296-98.
125 See id. at 1280-83, 1299-1301.
126 Id. at 1285; see a1so id. at 1296 (recognizing that his position may seem "cynical").
Alschuler hints at a revolutionary goal of fomenting the overthrow of plea bargaining by
exposing its internal contradictions. See id. at 1298 ("Ultimately, . . . the civilized solu-
tion ... would be to eliminate the dilemma that confronts assertedly innocent defendants
under the guilty-plea system . . . . When our consciences cause us to deny the coercive
character of the system that we have created, we magnify its injustice as we delude our-
selves."). Allowing Alford and nolo pleas, however, will more likely maintain the status quo
and cause growing public cynicism about the entire system.
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in innocence. 127 In contrast, jury verdicts and unequivocal guilty
pleas suppress residual doubts and promote public confidence. 128
The justice system should forestall cynicism by forbidding prac-
tices that openly promote injustice or public doubts about guilt. As
the Supreme Court noted in Winship, the law goes to great lengths to
minimize the risk of erroneous convictions. 129 The perception of ac-
curacy is needed "to command the respect and confidence of the
community .... It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law
not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned."' 130
Public confidence and faith in the justice system are essential to
the law's democratic legitimacy, moral force, and popular obedi-
ence.131 When citizens learn that defendants are pleading and being
punished while refusing to admit guilt and even protesting their inno-
cence, they may well suspect coercion and injustice. 13 2 They also may
conclude that our system does not care enough about separating
guilty from innocent defendants. Some may believe that the defen-
dant is guilty but refuses to admit it, while others may doubt the de-
fendant's guilt and blame the system's callousness. A system less
obsessed with efficiency would slow down and take a closer look at
these cases. As a result, the inefficient safeguards of trial might catch
some of these injustices. But our obsession with efficiency and auton-
omy has led us to downplay the importance ofjustice and the public's
perception ofjustice. This may partially explain why only one-third of
the American public expresses confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem and why two-thirds think plea bargaining is a problem.
133
127 As suggested earlier, most defendants who enter Alford and nolo pleas are probably
guilty. Thejudges and prosecutors I interviewed feared that defendants will enter Alford or
nolo pleas and protest their innocence, undermining public trust in the justice system. See
supra Part II.C. For example, imagine how society would have perceived the Sara Jane
Olson case had Olson pleaded guilty without ever admitting guilt.
128 See Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion, supra note 37, at 76-77 (arguing that "in
criminal litigation, residual uncertainties should be suppressed" at trial or by plea).
129 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
13 0 Id. at 364.
131 See E. ALLAN LIND & Tomt R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURALJUSTICE
210-11 (1988); see also Fred W. Friendly, On Judging the Judges, in STATE COURTS: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE 70, 72 (Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts ed., 1978) ("[A] public that is
cynical or ignorant about its laws is a lawless one.").
132 United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1971) ("[T]he public might
well not understand or accept the fact that a defendant who denied his guilt was nonethe-
less placed in a position of pleading guilty and going to jail.").
133 See AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 54-55
& tbl. 4.2 (TimothyJ. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (plea bargaining); Law-
rence W. Sherman, Trust and Confidence in CriminalJustice, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Mar. 2002, at
22, 23 (confidence in the system in general).
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Because there are no published poll data on Alford and nolo con-
tendere pleas, I conducted my own poll of law students. 13 4 Approxi-
mately 62% of respondents doubted the fairness of hypothetical nolo
contendere convictions, and 78% doubted the fairness of hypothetical
Alford convictions. In addition, nolo contendere pleas led 27% of re-
spondents to have less faith in the criminal justice system. Alford pleas
led 51% to have less faith in the justice system. Though this small poll
is not definitive, it is highly suggestive. Proving a causal link between
particular pleas and the justice system's reputation is largely impossi-
ble, but prudence counsels erring on the side of caution. A serious
concern for safeguarding innocent defendants, justice, and the popu-
lar perception of justice would support abolishing or at least severely
restricting Alford and nolo pleas.
IV
VALUES OF THE SUBSTANTIVWE CRIMINAL LAw
The preceding Part opposed Alford and nolo contendere pleas
based on their actual and perceived inaccuracy and unfairness. Al-
though this conclusion is at odds with the scholarly literature support-
ing these pleas, 135 those analyses rested on conventional procedural
values. Suppose that we could ensure that defendants entered nolo
and Alford pleas freely, without coercion or misunderstanding. Fur-
ther suppose that we could make the pleas perfectly accurate, thus
dispelling popular concerns that courts are convicting innocent de-
134 In August 2002, my research assistant distributed questionnaires to 746 University
of Iowa College of Law students; 138 students responded. There were four versions of the
questionnaire, each with a different crime hypothetical: spousal murder, forcible date
rape, child molestation, and embezzlement. Each student received only one question-
naire, with one fact pattern. Each questionnaire briefly described the case to simulate what
a citizen might learn about a case on the evening news. Each questionnaire also explained
briefly what no-contest and Alford pleas are and asked students to suppose that the defen-
dant in the case had entered a no-contest or Alford plea. When asked how a no-contest
plea would affect the respondent's attitude toward the fairness of the hypothetical convic-
tion, 8.0% expressed serious doubts about the conviction's fairness, 54.3% expressed some
doubts, and 37.7% said they would have no doubts. When asked the same question about
Alford pleas, 23.9% expressed serious doubts about the fairness of the conviction, 54.1%
expressed some doubts, and 21.7% said they would have no doubts. Another question
asked how a no-contest plea would affect the respondent's attitude about the criminal
justice system. In response, 2.9% said they would have much less faith in the criminal
justice system as a result, 23.9% would have somewhat less faith, 67.4% said their opinions
would not change, 5.1% would have more faith, and 0.8% did not respond. The final
question asked how an Alford plea would affect the respondent's attitude about the crimi-
nal justice system. In response, 17.4% said they would have much less faith in the criminal
justice system, 33.4% said they would have somewhat less faith in it, 46.4% said their opin-
ions would not change, and 2.9% said they would have more faith. Respondents were most
troubled by these pleas in the spousal-murder hypothetical, followed in order by the forci-
ble rape, child molestation, and embezzlement hypotheticals. I will gladly share my survey
forms and responses with any interested researcher.
135 See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
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fendants. Even so, these pleas would undercut important values and
norms of substantive criminal law. Nolo and Alford pleas interfere
with the defendant's contrition, education, and reform, and send
muddied messages that obstruct catharsis and vindication of social
norms and victims. Moreover, these pleas let guilty defendants dodge
responsibility for their actions. Procedural efficiency does not justify
ignoring these important substantive values, because substance is the
very raison ditre of procedure. Though substantive values need not
trump procedural values, they should at least carry significant weight
to avoid cannibalizing the law.' 36
Part IV's overt examination of criminal procedure's moral
messages will discomfort some readers. Other readers will disagree
with this Part's weighing of the moral pros and cons if they value de-
fendants' privacy more highly than reform, victim vindication, and ex-
pression of community condemnation. Criminal justice discourse
often avoids these objections by shying away from contentious moral
disagreements. It seems easier to avoid morality and achieve consen-
sus on seemingly apolitical issues of efficiency, accuracy, and deter-
rence. 137 Nonetheless, moral questions lie at the root of criminal
procedure. In practice, people judge criminal justice not on technical
issues, but on social and moral ones.138  These social and moral
dimensions are central to evaluating criminal procedures, and ignor-
ing them will not make them disappear.
Subpart A reviews the justifications for punishment that under-
gird the substantive criminal law. In addition to deterring and inca-
pacitating, the criminal law aspires to reform, educate, vindicate
victims, produce catharsis, and express condemnation. Subpart A also
reviews the basic moral norms embodied in the criminal law, such as
136 Perhaps one could imagine exceptional circumstances in which sacrificing substan-
tive values in a few cases would allow the system to further those substantive values in many
more cases. The burden would be on the proceduralists to show that Alford and nolo
contendere pleas in fact satisfy this implausible suggestion. To my knowledge, no one has
yet suggested that this is true.
137 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of'Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 435
(1999) (arguing that in a liberal polity, we use the language of deterrence as a seemingly
value-neutral way to mask contentious moral disagreements, a method which preserves
peace but masks the true role that moral judgments play in ascribing blame and
punishment).
138 See id. at 416. Ultimately, Kahan comes to no firm conclusion about whether this
suppression of moral discourse is good or bad as a general matter. See id. at 476-85. Those
who prize suppression of disagreement in a liberal polity will perhaps disagree with my
endorsement of overt moralizing. However, the importance of this concern in the context
of most criminal laws is questionable. Most crimes, with the possible exception of a few
low-level drug possession and other victimless crimes, rest on a widely shared moral con-
sensus about what qualifies as malum in se. If there is an unshakable consensus that miur-
der, rape, and robbery are wrong, then it is far from clear that we must hide our shared
moral sentiments in order to avoid civic strife. At least in this sphere, avoiding the lan-
guage of morality may be unduly cautious and inhibit robust, honest debate.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
honesty and responsibility for one's actions. Subpart B explores the
psychological denial mechanisms of offenders (especially sex offend-
ers) who refuse to admit guilt. It also discusses the therapeutic value
of inducing confessions by encouraging and confronting defendants
who refuse to admit guilt. Finally, subpart C explains why guilty pleas
should be reserved for defendants who confess and thereby take the
first steps toward repentance and reform.
A. Justifications for Punishment and the Law's Moral Norms
One influential strand of criminal law scholarship takes a narrow,
utilitarian view of the pains and pleasures associated with crimes. Ac-
cording to Jeremy Bentham, criminals commit crimes because doing
so benefits them. 139 To counteract these benefits, the criminal law
incapacitates and deters offenders by attaching to crimes sufficiently
unpleasant and restrictive punishment. 40
The criminal law does operate in part on this simple level of plea-
sure and pain, but it also serves other, more morally laden functions.
As Kant explained, punishment "ought to be done in order that every
one may realize the desert of his deeds."' 41 The word "realize" has
two relevant meanings, both of which Kant appears to mean. First,
offenders realize punishments in the way that entrepreneurs realize
profits: they reap what they have sown, the retribution that they have
earned. 142 Second, punishment is a powerful "symbol' of moral blame-
worthiness that is "medicinal for the criminal and [sets] an example
for others."'143 In other words, punishment reforms and deters in part
by educating the offender and society.
Jean Hampton also espoused the theory of punishment as moral
education, stating that punishment teaches the offender that the
crime is forbidden because it is morally and legally wrong. 44 Punish-
ment is also a strong tool for penetrating callous hearts. In the words
of C.S. Lewis, it shatters our illusions and "plants the flag of truth
within the fortress of a rebel soul."'1 45 Punishment seeks to teach by
139 SeeJEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION 170 & n.] (Claredon Press 1907) (1823).
140 See id.
141 KANT, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 116, at 198; see KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 116, at
*333.
142 See KANT, METAPIYSICS, supra note 116, at *331-32; KANT, PHILOSOPHY, supra note
116, at 195-97.
143 Letter from Immanuel Kant toJ.B. Erhard (Dec. 21, 1792), in KANT: PHILOSOPI-
CAL CORRESPONDENCE 1759-99, at 199 (Arnulf Zweig ed. & trans., 1967).
144 SeeJean Hampton, The Moral Education Theoty of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT: A Pi-
LOSOP4Y & PUBLIC AFFAIRS RFADER 112, 115-17, 120-21 (A. John Simmons et al. eds.,
1995).
145 C.S. LEwis, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 95 (1962); accord id. at 93-95, 120-22; see also 2
NIKOLAI VELIMIROVI, THE PROLOGUE FROM OCHRID 301 (Mother Maria trans., 1985) (ex-
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triggering and developing the offender's sense of guilt. It tries to in-
duce contrition and repentance so that the offender will repudiate his
past wrongful act and avoid committing it again. 146 As R.A. Duff
notes, punishment tries "to bring the criminal to understand the na-
ture and implications of her crime; to repent that crime; and thus, by
willing her own punishment as a penance which can expiate her
crime, to reconcile herself with the Right and with her community."' 147
In a similar vein, Stephen Garvey sees punishment as a secular version
of atonement, a way of reconciling offenders with victims and reinte-
grating them into the community.14 Before offenders can atone and
be reconciled, however, they must first accept responsibility, learn
their lessons, and resolve to mend their ways.' 49 Of course, some of-
fenders will learn these lessons only in part, and some not at all.
Nonetheless, the law respects their moral agency by trying to teach
them the errors of their ways. The hope is that punishing offenders
increases the chance that they will repent and change their ways.
Scholars and commentators too often overlook this idea of repen-
tance and atonement when they discuss the justifications of
punishment.
Regardless of whether offenders learn their lessons and repent,
their punishment has moral value for others. For example, criminals
demean victims by disregarding and trampling on their moral worth.
Punishing offenders vindicates the worth of their victims and humbles
wrongdoers by asserting that they are not entitled to abuse others. 15"
plaining that when a person's spirit and conscience are insensitive, love requires punishing
the body to rouse the spirit and conscience from their sleep).
146 See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 254-62 (1986); see also THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 35 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1960) (1651) (defining "Revengeful-
ness" as "[djesire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own").
147 DUFF, supra note 146, at 259 (followingJ.M.E. McTaggart's reading of Hegel's the-
ory of punishment).
148 Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1804 (1999).
Indeed, the word "atone" comes from "at one"-atonement makes the offender at one
with the victim and the community. OXFORD ENGLISH DicTIONARY 754 (2d ed. 1989).
149 See Garvey, supra note 148, at 1804; cf U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1
& cmt. n.1 (2000) (reducing sentences for defendants who accept responsibility, as mani-
fested by timely confessions, cessation of criminal activities and association, restitution, sur-
render, and rehabilitative efforts). The idea of repentance is similar:
Repentance is the remorseful acceptance of responsibility for one's wrong-
ful and harmful actions, the repudiation of the aspects of one's character
that generated the actions, the resolve to do one's best to extirpate those
aspects of one's character, and the resolve to atone or make amends for the
[wrong and] harm that one has done.
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PER-
SPEcTIVE 143, 147 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997).
15o SeeJean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, inJEFFRIE G. MURPHY &JEAN HAMPTON, FOR-
GIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 124-32 (1988) (explaining that "the retributive motive for in-
flicting suffering is to annul or counter the appearance of the wrongdoer's superiority and
thus affirm the victim's real value").
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Punishment thus serves a cathartic function for victims and brings
them closure. 15 1 If wrongdoers confess, or better yet, repent and apol-
ogize, victims can more readily forgive, surrender resentments, and
find peace.1 5 2
This symbolic moral significance of punishment extends beyond
the victim to society at large. Punishment denounces the wrong and
reaffirms society's moral teachings. 153 As James Fitzjames Stephen
wrote, "the sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public
in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax. It converts into a
permanent final judgment what might otherwise be a transient senti-
ment."'154 Our criminal procedures thus allow the community to vent
its outrage, satisfying the public's sense of justice by bringing catharsis
and closure. ' 55
Though the literature often speaks of vindicating the commu-
nity's norms, it rarely spells out those moral norms. The most promi-
nent norm is the belief that criminal law promotes honesty, good
faith, and trustworthiness by stigmatizing perjury, fraud, and the like.
By forbidding crimes of violence and property, the law encourages
self-discipline, peaceful conduct, and respect for persons and prop-
151 Some might understand this catharsis as simply satisfying the raw primal urge to
punish, which arguably is an illegitimate goal of punishment. One can, however, instead
understand catharsis as a nobler satisfaction at seeing the law do justice and vindicate rules
of right and wrong.
152 See Hampton, supra note 150, at 154 (stating that repentance paves the way for
forgiveness and an end to alienation); Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FOR-
GIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 150, at 14, 24-26 (same); Garvey, supra note 148, at
1827-29 (arguing that when offenders repent and, better yet, apologize, they enable vic-
tims to forgive, overcome resentment, and reconcile with the offenders).
153 See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING & DESERVING: Es-
SAYS IN THE THEORY OF RFSPONSIBILrry 95, 101-05 (1970); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXI',LAKNAIONS 370-74 (1981); 2JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF 1-IE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 80-82 (London, MacMillan 1883);Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retri-
bution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 20-22 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404-05 (1958); Dan M.
Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. C. L. REV. 591, 593, 597-601 (1996); see
also EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 105-10 (George Simpson trans.,
Macmillan 1933) (1893) (noting that "penal law protects against all enfeeblement [by]
demanding from each of us a minimum of resemblances without which the individual
would be a menace to the unity of the social body").
154 2 STEPHEN, supra note 153, at 81.
155 See David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis
in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3, 38-41 (1986-87); see also Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-72 (1980) (stressing importance of visible, com-
prehensible justice to allow "community catharsis" and to "provid[e] an outlet for
community concern, hostility, and emotion"); cf ARISrOTLE, PoE-rIcs 25-26 (Gerald F.
Else, trans., Univ. of Mich. Press 1967) ("Tragedy, then, is a process of imitating an action
which has serious implications .. through a course of pity and fear completing the purifi-
cation of tragic acts ...."); Gerald F. Else, Introduction and Notes to ARISTOTLE, supra, at 1,
6-7, 97 n.101 (amplifying Aristotle's point that great tragedy plays upon the audience's
fear and pity to bring catharsis, purifying or purging the spectator as a form of poetry).
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erty. As a rule, it holds people responsible for their actions, treating
them as moral agents. Finally, it insists on moral culpability, in the
form of mens rea and voluntariness, and therefore excuses defendants
who act under duress, insanity, infancy, or other incapacity.
In short, criminal punishment is intended to do much more than
deter and incapacitate as cheaply and swiftly as possible. It also seeks
to educate the offender, induce repentance and reconciliation, vindi-
cate the victim, achieve catharsis, and reinforce societal norms. Of
course, criminal law does not always achieve these goals. It does less
to educate offenders than it could. Moreover, this lack of education
impedes deterrence, repentance, and reconciliation, all of which de-
pend on offenders' learning the errors of their ways. By failing to
thoroughly denounce crimes, the criminal law also hinders the vindi-
cation of victims and moral norms. Rather than abandon these goals,
however, we must bring practice into harmony with these ideals. Sub-
part B explains how confessions help to teach and change offenders
in general and sex offenders in particular.
B. Reluctance to Confess and the Value of Confession
To achieve these goals, the criminal law seeks to lead offenders to
repent by humbling them, to exact moral sanctions, and then to re-
turn them to the community as equals. Offenders cannot accept re-
sponsibility and repent until they admit their actions. Admitting
wrongdoing to oneself and to others is not easy, however. Many of-
fenders are in denial about their wrongs. They may feel guilty about
what they have done and therefore may be ashamed to admit their
wrongs to others. 5 6 To avoid responsibility, they may publicly or pri-
vately deny their acts or awareness, justify or excuse their conduct, or
minimize its gravity or harm. In short, they shield themselves from
the painful truth by lying to themselves and others.
These problems are most acute in the case of especially heinous
or shameful crimes, such as sex offenses. 1 57 Therefore, it is no coinci-
156 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1280 (quoting one defense lawyer as saying "'the
psychological obstacles to confession in [a sex] case are so often overpowering'"); id. at
1287 (quoting two defense lawyers, one of whom stated that "'[s]ome clients beg to plead
guilty while still asserting their innocence. Their egos are so involved in their initial deni-
als of guilt that it is psychologically impossible for them to change,"' and another of whom
said that "'[t]here are many things people do that they can never bring themselves to
admit. Some defendants are literally insane on this point.'"); id. at 1304 (discussing de-
fendants "who are psychologically incapable of admitting their guilt" and those who want
"face-saving denials of culpability-'grace notes' that could enable the defendants to pre-
tend to their families, to their friends, or perhaps even to themselves that they were the
hapless victims of circumstance").
157 See MARC S. CARICH, SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT OVERVIEW: TRAINING FOR THE
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL 20 (1997); BARRY M. MALETZKY & KEVIN B. McGOVERN,
TREATING THE SEXUAL OFFENDER 12-27 (1991).
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dence that sex offenders are among the most frequent users of Alford
and nolo contendere pleas.' 5 8 Sex offenders deny the facts, their acts,
their awareness, or their responsibility, or minimize the wrongfulness
or impact of their behavior. 159 They deny guilt to their families,
friends, employers, and society at large to avoid shame and embarrass-
ment. 11  They are also "afraid to admit the truth, even to themselves.
The thought of being a sexual deviant can be so frightening or repug-
nant to them that they hide from themselves for years."'"'
In many cases, these lies and explanations are not simply excuses
for public consumption. Rather, they reveal underlying attitudes and
cognitive distortions that may lead to more sexual offenses in the fu-
ture. 162 Offenders who lie to others begin to lie to themselves and
158 See supra Part II.C.
159 SeeJunri-ti LEWIS HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 22 (1981) ("Denial has always
been the incestuous father's first line of defense."); MALETFZKY & McGOVERN, supra note
157, at 27, 164-65, 253-55 (finding that 87% of sex offenders denied all or part of their
crime when first interviewed, are often in denial when referred for therapy, and may give
lip service to acceptance of responsibility but rarely appreciate the seriousness or harm of
their actions); ANNA C. SAUrER, TREATING CHILD SEX OFFEND3ERS AND VICTIMS: A PRACT'IICAL
GUIDE 97 (1988); Howard E. Barbaree, Denial and Minimization Among Sex Offenders: Assess-
ment and Treatment Outcome, F. ON CORRECrrIONS RES., No. 4 1991, at 30, 32 tbl.1 (finding
that 54% of rapists denied any offense at all and 42% minimized their responsibility, harm
to the victim, or the extent of their actions, and also finding that 66% of child molesters
denied the offense and 33% minimized it); Richard M. Happel & Joseph J. Auffrey, Sex
Offender Assessment: Interrupting the Dance of Denial, AM. J. FORENSIC] Ps'ci-HOL., No. 2 1995, at
5, 6 ("it is rare to find incarcerated sex offenders who are completely honest about their
sexual deviance or history of sexual offending. Instead they deny culpability and minimize
their behavior. Simply put, they fail to understand the traumatic impact of their sexual
aberrance."); Nathan L. Pollock & Judith M. Hashmall, The Excuses of Child Molesters, 9
BEIAV. SCI. & L. 53, 57 & fig.] (1991); Diana Scully & Joseph Marolla, Convicted Rapists'
Vocabulary of Motive: Excuses and Justifications, 31 SoC. PROBS. 530 (1984); Mack E. Winn, The
Strategic and Systematic Management of Denial in the Cognitive/Behavioral Treatment of Sexual
Offenders, 8 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 25, 27-28 (1996).
160 See Happel & Auffrey, supra note 159, at 6; William O'Donohue & Elizabeth
Letourneau, A Brief Group Treatment for the Modification of Denial in Child Sexual Abusers:
Outcome and Follow-Up, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLEcT 299, 303 (1993) ("Clients ... reported
that the major reason why they were in denial was the fear of consequences, especially the
reactions of loved ones.").
161 Happel & Auffrey, supra note 159, at 6. In contrast, white-collar defendants are
more likely to lie to avoid shame and protect their reputations. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
lw ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN
ASSESSMENT 111 (1967) (explaining that white-collar defendants use nolo contendere pleas
in part to lessen the "public stigma" they suffer); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming
White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON.
365, 368-72 (1999) (explaining that shaming penalties would be particularly effective in
deterring crime by attacking the good reputations that are so precious to white-collar of-
fenders); see also text accompanying note 57 (describing the argument that nolo con-
tendere pleas protect "respectable citizens" who are "technically guilty").
162 See Gene G. Abel et al., Sex Offenders: Results of Assessment and Recommendations for
Treatment, in CLINICAL CRIMINOLOGY: TIE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF CRIMINAL BFIIAV-
IOR 191, 198-204 (Mark H. Ben-Aron et al. eds., 1985); Gene G. Abel et al., Comtplications,
Consent and Cognitions in Sex Between Children and Adults, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY. 89
(1984).
1394
2003] HARMONIZING SUBSTANTIVE-CRIMINAL-LAW VALUES 1395
distort their memories and interpretations of events.'16 " For example,
a molester might say that there is nothing wrong with having sex with
a child,164 or a rapist might say and believe that the victim asked for
it.t65
These cognitive distortions and denials impede treatment. Ad-
mitting one's wrongdoing is the first step toward moving beyond it. 166
In twelve-step programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous, for example,
admitting that one has a problem is an essential step to recovery. 167
Confessed offenders can no longer rest complacent in the illusions
that they are good people. In addition, confessing forces offenders to
reveal details of their offenses, which is essential to framing a thera-
peutic response. 168 Denial prevents therapists from examining cogni-
tive distortions, detecting warning signs, and nurturing empathy
for victims. 16 9 Thus, most treatment programs refuse to admit sex
offenders who deny any sexual conduct. 170  Denial, in short, ob-
163 SeeJohn F. Ulrich, A Case Study Comparison of Brief Group Treatment and Brief
Individual Treatment in the Modification of Denial Among Child Sexual Abusers 52
(1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University) (on file with the James White
Library, Andrews University).
164 SALTER, supra note 159, at 99.
165 Happel & Auffrey, supra note 159, at 6; see Pollock & Hashmall, supra note 159, at
58.
166 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33-34 (2002) (plurality opinion); Winn, supra note
159, at 26-27. As the Ninth Circuit noted, "[i]t is almost axiomatic that the first step to-
ward rehabilitation of an offender is the offender's recognition that he was at fault." Gol-
laher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1969) (affirming trial court's decision to
impose a harsher sentence because of defendant's refusal to admit guilt after he was
convicted).
167 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS 21-24 (1981)
(noting that in Step One, an alcoholic must "humbl[e] himself" and be "rigorously honest"
as a prerequisite to change); id. at 55-62 (stating that in Step Five, alcoholics must humble
themselves by admitting their defects to others, in order to pierce self-delusions, rational-
izations, and wishful thinking); see Robert A. Moore & Thomas C. Murphy, Denial ofAlcohol-
ism as an Obstacle to Recovery, 22 Q.J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 597 (1961).
168 See Barbaree, supra note 159, at 30 ("Therapists depend on offenders' truthful de-
scriptions of events leading to past offences in order to determine which behaviours need
to be targetted [sic] in therapy."); Diane D. Hildebran & William D. Pithers, Relapse Preven-
tion: Application and Outcome, in 2 THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN: CLINICAL ISSUES 365,
367-75 (William O'Donohue & James H. Geer eds., 1992); O'Donohue & Letourneau,
supra note 160, at 300.
169 Stefan J. Padfield, Comment, Self-Incrimination and Acceptance of Responsibility in
Prison Sex Offender Treatment Programs, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 487, 498 (2001).
170 Randy Green, Comprehensive Treatment Planning for Sex Offenders, in NAT'L INST. OF
CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO TREATING THE INCARCERATED
MALE SEX OFFENDER 71, 72-73 (1988) [hereinafter A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE] ("Most treat-
ment programs will take on only those offenders who admit their guilt.... The offender
should be able to openly acknowledge guilt. This admission is a basic requirement for
meaningful participation."); BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL., Ai. BAR ASS'N, THE PROBATION RE-
SPONSE TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE OFFENDERS: How Is IT WORKING? 8 (1990) ("With few ex-
ceptions, the therapists interviewed said they would not accept anyone in their program
who absolutely denied sexual contact with children. Most firmly believed that individuals
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structs treatment, which in turn greatly increases the risk of recidi-
vism. 
17 1
When wrongdoers do not admit responsibility, many therapists
find it helpful to confront them with the facts to force them to come
to terms with their behavior.172 Firmly challenging these denials and
distortions is a "very effective" way of overcoming them t. 1 7 3 Therapists
must actively confront and challenge sex offenders because support-
ive, passive therapy usually fails. 174 Such challenges may be direct or
indirect, led by the therapist or the offenders' loved ones, coupled
with empathy, and may consist of asking for explanations and details,
questioning inconsistencies, or encouraging the offender to challenge
himself. 175 By confronting offenders about their excuses and rational-
izations, therapists can trigger feelings of guilt and harness this guilt
who denied the abuse were not amenable to treatment."); O'Donohue & Letourneau,
supra note 160, at 300.
According to my interviews, see supra Part II.C, the sex-offender treatment program in
Missouri state prison requires admission of guilt as a condition of therapy. Thus, Missouri
judges will not allow sex offenders to enter Alford pleas.
171 See McKune, 536 U.S. at 33 (noting that untreated offenders are more than five
times as likely to recidivate as treated offenders (80% versus 15%), and that denial greatly
increases the likelihood that offenders will fail treatment (citing MALETZKY & MCGOVERN,
supra note 157, at 253-55, and A PRACiTrrIONER's GUIDE, supra note 170, at xiii)); Lucy
Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1203, 1209-10 (1998) (report-
ing two randomized, controlled studies that found higher recidivism rates for untreated
sex offenders, and noting that in one study, nearly three-quarters of untreated sex offend-
ers reoffended, compared to one-eighth of treated offenders).
172 See SALTER, supra note 159, at 93-95.
173 W.L. Marshall, Treatment Effects on Denial and Minimization in Incarcerated Sex Offend-
ers, 32 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 559, 563 (1994).
174 WILLIAM E. PRENDERGAST, TREATING SEX OFFENDERS IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS
AND OUTPATIENT CLINICS: A GUIDE 10 CLINICAL PRACTICE 105-08, 111-12 (1991).
175 , See id. at 107 (suggesting therapists ask for explanations and details or flatly reject
the offenders' contentions); MALETZKY & McGOVERN, supra note 157, at 156-58, 160-61
(discussing group confrontation and role-playing); SALTER, supra note 159, at 112-17
(describing confrontational group therapy); id. at 124-27 (discussing cognitive restructur-
ing); Barbaree, supra note 159, at 32 (advocating the use of group therapy to challenge
discrepancies); Gad Czudner & Ruth Mueller, The Role of Guilt and Its Implication in the
Treatment of Criminals, 31 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 71, 73-74
(1987) (suggesting group therapy involving repetition, control, and peer pressure to break
down excuses); Michael J. Dougher, Clinical Assessment of Sex Offenders, in A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE, supra note 170, at 77, 79 (suggesting that "sex education, group therapy, and cogni-
tive-behavior techniques may be useful" for dealing with cognitive distortions); Randy
Green, Sex Offender Treatment Program Evaluation, in A PRAITrrIONER'S GUIDE, supra note
170, at 61, 70 (suggesting confrontation through group therapy and cognitive-behavior
therapy); Marshall, supra note 173, at 561-62 (discussing group therapy using "supportive
but firm challenges" to test veracity and inconsistencies); Winn, supra note 159, at 30-33
(endorsing indirect confrontation, challenging offenders to challenge themselves, and
eliciting the offender's permission to confront); Ulrich, supra note 163, at 298, 309-10
(suggesting that group therapy pushes, pulls, and encourages offenders to confess as they
see others doing so).
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to induce change. 176 Even external pressures, such as the threat of
imprisonment, can induce offenders to overcome their denial.1 77
Confessions and denials within the legal system may have effects
similar to confessions and denials within therapy. Confessions in
open court, even if induced by external pressure, may begin to breach
offenders' denial. 178 If offenders who confess later try to recant dur-
ing treatment, therapists may confront them with the details of their
initial confessions. In contrast, repeated unchallenged denials in the
legal system only exacerbate offenders' denial reflex, making subse-
quent treatment even harder. 179 Thus, offenders who enter Alford or
nolo pleas may resist successful treatment and are much more likely to
reoffend. I8 0 For example, one small Minnesota study found that
seven out of eight sex offenders who had entered Alford pleas reof-
fended within five years of release.' 8 ' This percentage is two to five
times the recidivism rate of sex offenders in general. 182
Two anecdotal interviews with judges indicate that offenders'
statements in court affect their own and others' perceptions of their
guilt.' 8 " One longtime judge reported that he used to allow defend-
ants to plead nolo contendere. He found that a defendant would say
nothing in court, but upon reporting to a probation officer for a pre-
sentence interview would deny guilt. The defendant would also tell
his family that he was innocent but that his lawyer had forced him to
176 Czudner & Mueller, supra note 175, at 73-74.
177 See O'Donohue & Letourneau, supra note 160, at 303.
178 See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 221-23 (1966); see also Elizabeth Mertz & Kimberly A. Lonsway, The Power
of Denial: Individual and Cultural Constructions of Child Sexual Abuse, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1415,
1418, 1457-58 (1998) (noting that the legal system, by challenging denials in the adversary
system, "can help to puncture false denials and reveal unpleasant truths"); Schma, supra
note 87, at 5 (noting that once a defendant has admitted to his guilt at a plea hearing, the
judge can use the details of that plea to confront the defendant more effectively at sentenc-
ing with the wrongfulness of the behavior).
179 See Marshall, supra note 173, at 562 (noting that when defense lawyers and ther-
apists fail to challenge sex offenders in denial, or even encourage them to exculpate them-
selves, offenders see these reactions as confirmation and become even more difficult to
treat).
180 See, e.g., MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., SEX OFFENDER SUPERVISION TRAINING, ch. 3, at 4, at
http://www.corr.state.mn.us/organization/commjuv/probationofficermanual.htm (dis-
cussing Norgaard pleas, the Minnesota equivalent of Alford pleas).
181 Id.
182 See Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Danger-
ousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 33, 51-59 (1997)
(collecting statistics and settling on recidivism figures between 20% and 45% for sexual
offenders); Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Assessing Violent Recidivism in Sexual
Offenders, 10 ISSUES IN CILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS 92, 93 (1998) (listing recidivism rates of
13% within four to five years and 39% to 52% within twenty-five years for sexual offenders);
supra note 171 (collecting statistics that compare recidivism of treated and untreated sex
offenders generally, without focusing specifically on the issue of denial).
183 See supra notes 85 and 178-82 and accompanying text.
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plead guilty. As a result, family members would write angry letters to
the judge, complaining that convicting an innocent man was a travesty
ofjustice. They would say, for example, that a rape victim was a tramp
who consented to sex. At sentencing, the defendant and his family
would continue to deny guilt and, at least implicitly, blame the victim.
Consequently, victims would be visibly frustrated when making state-
ments at sentencing, feeling that they had to justify themselves. These
convicted defendants Would continue to deny guilt after sentencing,
thus impeding therapy or treatment. Once this judge stopped permit-
ting most nolo contendere pleas, however, defense lawyers confronted
clients and made them admit guilt, and almost none insisted on going
to trial. Defendants and families no longer denied guilt at sentencing
or afterwards, the letters from defendants' families stopped, and of-
fenders seemed less defiant, more contrite, and less openly hostile
and angry. Victims felt vindicated and expressed healthy outrage in-
stead of frustration at sentencing. Finally, the judge, having heard a
detailed plea colloquy, was better able to confront defendants with the
details and wrongfulness of their acts. 184 Another judge confirmed
these conclusions. He noted that some defendants are agitated and
balk at admitting guilt, but they plead guilty when told that trial is the
only alternative. These defendants seem calmer and more accepting
of responsibility after their guilty-plea allocutions and are less likely to
protest innocence and injustice later on.
An analogous dynamic may be at work in insanity cases. Several
case studies show that offenders who are found not guilty by reason of
insanity resist discussing their thoughts, feelings, and actions.18 5 In-
stead, they externalize their feelings of blame.'8 6 They may show no
remorse, saying "The judge said I was not guilty"18 7 or "I have not
committed a crime."' 8 In contrast, persons with mental illness who
are convicted of crimes may react more positively. Society's pro-
nouncement of guilt may spur and reinforce the offender's introspec-
tion, acceptance of responsibility, and treatment prospects. s'8 ' In
short, 'judicial expression[s] of blameworthiness" promote "ac-
cept[ance of] emotional responsibility for actions committed during
periods of gross mental disorder," which in turn may aid treatment
and reform. 1-1
184 Cf. Schma, supra note 87, at 5 (describing a similar experience).
185 See Robert A. Fein, How the Insanity Acquittal Retards Treatment, in DAVID B. WEXLER,
THERAPEUIIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THFRAPEUTIC AGENT 49, 52-55 (1990).
186 Id. at 54.
187 id. at 53, 54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188 Id. at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189 See, e.g., id. at 55-57.
190 Id. at 52. I am not arguing that the insanity defense is good or bad-there are
many other pros and cons to consider. My point is simply that the law's ascriptions of
blame influence an offender's rehabilitation and reform.
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Although this evidence comes primarily from the psychological
literature on sex offenders, substance abusers, and mentally ill offend-
ers, guilt, psychological blocks, and confessions play similar roles in
treating other kinds of offenders.19 Perhaps it is dangerous to gener-
alize, but one might extrapolate based on my interviews that other
offenders who enter Alford and nolo contendere pleas are doing so in
part because they face similar psychological blocks. 192 The idea is in-
tuitively plausible. Offenders who are not reluctant to confess enter
straight guilty pleas. In contrast, offenders whose psychological barri-
ers impede confession, to others or even to themselves, are the pri-
mary users of Alford and nolo pleas. 19 3 They are also presumably those
in the deepest denial, and thus, those who most need to come clean.
Some defendants are willing to confess and plead guilty. As Al-
schuler rightly notes, most guilty pleas are not the fruit of genuine
repentance. 94 Instead, defendants feign repentance to earn sentence
reductions. 9 5 But even feigned or induced repentance may teach les-
sons to some offenders. The very act of confessing and pleading guilty
in open court heightens the defendant's awareness of the victim's in-
jury, the norm violated, and the community's condemnation. 9 6 In-
deed, the ordeal of feigning repentance, even if initially done for the
wrong reasons, can sometimes lead to. genuine repentance. 197 For
many, confessing is difficult because it requires admitting shameful
191 See, e.g., Czudner & Mueller, supra note 175, at 72-76 (discussing offenders gener-
ally, the need for confessions as prerequisites for treatment, and the constructive role of
guilt as an inducement to reform, and giving clinical examples of offenders whose crimes
ranged from assault to breaking and entering to armed robbery and attempted murder).
192 See supra Part II.C; see aLso supra note 156 and accompanying text (citing similar
interviews by Alschuler).
193 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1304 (describing the Alford plea as a "crutch" that is
needed for "a small group of obviously guilty defendants who are psychologically incapable
of admitting their guilt"); supra Part II.C.
1 94 See Alschuler, The Changing P'lea Bargaining Debate, supra note 38, at 662-63.
195 See id.
196 See Amitai Etzioni, Introduction to REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 149, at 1, 10.
197 See Garvey, supra note 148, at 1850 & n.215 ("A man should always occupy himself
with Torah and good deeds, though it is not for their own sake, for out of [doing good]
with an ulterior motive there comes [doing good] for its own sake (alterations in original)
(quoting Pesahim 50b (H. Freedman trans.), in 4 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD pt. 2, at 245 (1.
Epstein ed., 1938)).
This point should be clear to anyone whose parent ever told him to apologize for
hitting a sibling. Even though the child's apology is grudging at first, over time apologiz-
ing inculcates the norm that hitting others is wrong and that the child should feel guilty
and ashamed of this wrong. Cognitive psychology teaches the same point. According to
cognitive dissonance theory, persons who publicly take positions that they do not believe
are likely to change their attitudes to bring them into line with their public statements. See
KENNETH S. BORDENS & IRWIN A. HOROWITZ, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 221 (2d ed. 2002). Thus,
offenders who publicly accept responsibility for their crimes, even if they do so insincerely,
are more likely to internalize that responsibility than those who persist in denying guilt.
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deeds, putting aside excuses, and taking responsibility for one's ac-
tions. As my interviews indicated, defense lawyers often have to work
with defendants before they admit guilt.198 The hard work of admit-
ting guilt and repenting may impress upon the defendant the wrong-
fulness and gravity of the crime. By admitting guilt, however
insincerely, defendants let down their denial mechanisms, begin the
process of reform, and bring closure to the community.199
Perhaps many defendants plead guilty cavalierly, confessing the
words without confronting their significance. But this description is
least true of those defendants who balk most at pleading guilty,
namely those who want Alford and nolo pleas. These defendants are
in the deepest denial and would have to struggle the most to admit
guilt. The bigger the struggle, the bigger the defendant's break-
through when he finally confesses. Indeed, it is a catharsis, literally a
cleansing, which is why we often speak of confession as coming clean.
C. The Substantive Value of Trials and the Harm of Guilty-but-
Not-Guilty Pleas
Whatever their other flaws, plea bargains induce guilty defend-
ants to confess and start repenting. Some defendants, however, can-
not or will not admit guilt. For these guilty defendants, as well as for
innocent defendants, the law provides jury trials.21" We usually think
198 See supra Part II.C.
199 See Gerard V. Bradley, Plea Bargaining and the Criminal Defendant's Obligation to Plead
Guilty, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 65, 71 (1999) ("The pleading defendant sets himself on the path
to moral reform. By accepting responsibility for his actions, he cements his status as one
who recognizes the basic ends of the law of crime and punishment."); supra text accompa-
nying note 184 (discussing the changes that ajudge noticed in defendants and their fami-
lies once the judge began refusing to allow nolo contendere pleas); see also MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 38 (1975) (noting community satisfaction at a criminal's
own acceptance of responsibility); William Burnham, The Legal Context and Contributions of
Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2002) (book review)
(describing Dostoevsky's "idea that confession is good for the soul and essential to gaining
redemption").
The value of confronting guilt and apologizing is a central insight of the restorative-
justice movement. Offenders confront their guilt and wrongdoing by meeting with victims,
learning about their sufferings, and perhaps apologizing and making amends. See, e.g.,
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 74-82 (2002); GERRY
JOHNSTONE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEAS, VALUES, DEBATES (2002); Garvey, supra note 148,
at 1840-44. Doubtless many offenders start out admitting wrongdoings and apologizing
grudgingly or insincerely. Nonetheless, the hope is that victim-offender mediation, sen-
tencing circles, family-group conferences, and the like will teach offenders moral lessons
by making them see the suffering they have caused.
200 1 am setting aside cases in which there is some doubt as to the meaning or applica-
bility of a particular law or doctrine, as well as cases in which a defendant is genuinely
unaware of whether a particular legal element is satisfied. Both kinds of cases strike me as
unusual and might well be classified as cases of possible innocence. I am also setting aside
cases in which the dispute is not over guilt but rather the degree or extent of culpability.
Again, to the extent that there are good-faith disagreements about the meaning of the law
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of jury trials as simply procedural safeguards designed to ensure accu-
racy and fairness. To borrow Herbert Packer's terminology, there are
two dominant approaches to criminal procedure. 2 1 Crime-control
advocates stress speedy and efficient pursuit of the truth;20 2 due-pro-
cess advocates emphasize procedural fairness and perceived fair-
ness. 203 Both views of criminal procedure, however, are incomplete.
Trials not only seek fairness, efficiency, and accuracy, but also further
the criminal law's substantive moral aims and norms. As Thurman
Arnold stated, "Trials are like the miracle or morality plays of ancient
times. They dramatically present the conflicting moral values of a
community in a way that could not be done by logical formaliza-
tion."20 4 The jury serves as the chorus of a Greek tragedy, "the con-
science of the community."20 5 It applies the community's moral code,
pronounces judgment, and brands or exonerates the defendant. 20 6
The parade of live witnesses and the solemn pronouncement of guilt
confront the offender at length with his wrongful deeds. This litany
of accusation, evidence, and condemnation may break through the
defendant's denial mechanisms, driving home in undeniable detail
the wrongfulness of the crime. 20 7 These morality plays hold out hope
for reforming guilty defendants and healing society. Colonial Ameri-
cans, for example, prized the trial as "an occasion for repentance and
reintegration: a ritual for reclaiming lost sheep and restoring them to
the flock."
2 °18
or the existence of certain facts, these cases fall within the possible-innocence category. To
the extent that the law is clear and the defendant knows the facts, these cases are more like
cases in which defendants refuse to admit guilt.
201 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 153 (1968).
202 Id. at 159.
203 Id. at 163-64.
204 Thurman Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol of Public Morality, in CRIMINAL JUs-
TICE IN OUR TIME 137, 143 (AE. Dick Howard ed., 1965); see also William J. Stuntz, Self-
Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REv. 1871, 1882 (2000) ("Criminal trials are morality plays.
Their public nature, and the rituals that surround them, seem designed for sending
messages, both about the system's care not to punish the undeserving and about the de-
served nature of the punishment the system imposes.").
205 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968) (explaining also thatjuries
are desirable because they inject "contemporary community values" into the punishment
decision).
206 See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 685 (1996)
("Criminal trials are unavoidably morality plays, focusing on the defendant's moral blame-
worthiness or lack thereof. And the assessment of his moral culpability is, under the Sixth
Amendment, a task for the community, via the jury, and not the judge .... "); Kyron
Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1462-67 (1995) (justifying the
criminal jury as an institution that applies the community's moral sense and sound practi-
cal judgment to the context of a particular crime).
207 Alternatively, the preparations for and prospect of facing trials may force offenders
and counsel to confront guilt, eventually leading to straight guilty pleas.
208 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (1993).
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For those offenders who refuse to confess or repent, trials still
bring catharsis and closure to victims and the community. As one
court noted, "Ijiury trials have historically served to vent community
pressures and passions. As the lid of a tea kettle releases steam, jury
trials in criminal cases allow peaceful expression of community out-
rage at arbitrary government or vicious criminal acts." 2°19 The Su-
preme Court has also stated that "public trials ha[ve] significant
community therapeutic value" and bring "community catharsis." 210
Trials express respect for the law, communicate values, justify punish-
ment, and encourage offenders to critically examine their acts. 2 1'
Moreover, convictions at trial vindicate victims and the community by
denouncing offenders and reaffirming moral norms in the face of
their transgression.212 This is true regardless of how offenders re-
spond. Conversely, acquittals at trial vindicate innocent defendants
and the moral norms on which they acted.213 Consider, for example,
the prosecution of John Peter Zenger for seditious libel in colonial
America. The jury's celebrated acquittal proclaimed to all eternity
Zenger's right to criticize the government.21 4
Alford and nolo contendere pleas, in the name of efficiency and
autonomy, subvert the substantive moral messages that unambiguous
209 United States v. Lewis, 638 F. Supp. 573, 580 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
21o Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-71 (1980).
211 See DuFF, supra note 146, at 123-27.
212 See DURKHEIM, supra note 153, at 80-82, 103-10; Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of
American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 145-46 (1987); MarkJ.
Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 463,
486-87 (1995). As suggested earlier, the victim-vindication and expressive functions of the
criminal law (as well as one vision of its educative function) are not contingent on psycho-
logical probabilities. Rather, they are analytically tied to the act of punishment in response
to a crime. See supra Part 1V.A. For example, C.S. Lewis argued that if a wrongdoer insists
on remaining rebellious and defiant, it is still better to punish him to assert the moral truth
in the face of its denial than to leave the truth unvindicated. LEwIs, supra note 145, at
121-22. Jean Hampton, Kant, and Hegel also agreed on the need to annul the crime's
false message. See Hampton, supra note 150, at 130-33 (arguing, citing Kant and Hegel,
that punishment is essential to annul the crime and vindicate the victim's value, even if the
wrongdoer remains defiant and unrepentant); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beauti-
fully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 2157, 2192-2206 (2001) (explaining why, according to Hampton and Hegel, pun-
ishment's education and vindication functions are not contingent on the offender's re-
sponse, but are analytically inseparable from the offender's awareness of the punishment).
213 Of course trials can make mistakes in both directions, freeing guilty defendants
and occasionally convicting innocent defendants. The point is not that trials are infallible,
but rather that trials bring closure by authoritatively proclaiming guilt or innocence. So
long as the public trusts that trials are by and large reliable, it matters less that an individ-
ual trial may err. These functions of catharsis and closure are jeopardized only when high-
profile trials lead to verdicts that the public perceives as flagrantly wrong (such as the
acquittals of O.J. Simpson and of Rodney King's attackers). Even so, there would have to
be a number of such cases before the public stopped trusting the results of the average
trial.
214 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 208, at 54-55.
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trial verdicts send. Alford and to a lesser extent nolo contendere pleas
are ambiguous on their faces. Guilty-but-not-guilty pleas muddy the
moral message by implying that the law does not care enough to insist
on clear, honest resolutions and vindications. Truth, justice, self-re-
straint, and respect for others take a back seat to procedural efficiency
and freedom of choice.2 15 By failing to challenge offenders who
falsely deny guilt, criminal procedure undermines the criminal law's
basic norms of honesty and responsibility for one's actions.
Some authors would prefer to shield guilty defendants from the
norms of justice. As Jonathan Kaden recognizes, Alford and nolo con-
tendere pleas allow defendants to preserve their autonomy, privacy,
and dignity by refusing to admit their guilt.2 16 Unfortunately, this au-
tonomy, privacy, and dignity come at the expense of education, repen-
tance, reconciliation, and vindication. Offenders have abused their
autonomy and privacy and need to humbly accept responsibility for
their wrongdoing.9 17 Herbert Morris notes that offenders have ag-
grandized themselves at the expense of victims by renouncing compli-
ance with the law. 218  Punishment seeks to "humbl[e] the
[defendant's] will,"'2 19 "to bring him low" after he has aggrandized
himself.2211 A guilty-plea allocution or a full-fledged jury trial teaches
215 Some plea bargains other than nolo or Alford pleas, especially charge bargains,
compromise or shade the truth, but they are beyond the scope of this Article. Though
many plea bargains are less than honest in describing charges and less than complete in
vindicating justice, at least they do not proclaim this dishonesty or inconsistency openly.
Alford and nolo contendere pleas, in contrast, are internally and facially contradictory.
216 SeeJonathan Kaden, Comment, Therapy for Convicted Sex Offenders: Pursuing Rehabili-
tation Without Incrimination, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347, 382, 389-90; accord State v.
Garcia, 532 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Wis. 1995) (endorsing Alford pleas as a way to allow defend-
ants accused of shameful crimes to "avoid ridicule and embarrassment"). One can ques-
tion the dignity of entering a plea that many may perceive as dishonest and manipulative.
Nonetheless, my interviews with lawyers and judges did indicate that some offenders view
these pleas as fig leaves that avert shame and guilt. See supra Part II.C.
217 Compare Virgil's view, in the Aeneid, that the role of a ruler is to keep the peace by
humbling the proud and sparing the meek:
Thine be the care, 0 Rome, to subdue the whole world to thine empire;
These be the arts for thee, the order of peach to establish,
Them that are vanquished to spare, and them that are haughty to humble!
THE AENEID OF VIRGIL book VI, at 278 lines 851-53 (Harlan Hoge Ballard trans., Riverside
Press 1902). The Psalmist ties this humbling to the law's function of educating wrongdo-
ers: "It is good for me that Thou hast humbled me, that I might learn Thy statutes." THE
PSALTER ACCORDING TO THE SEVENTY Psalms 118:71 (Holy Transfiguration Monastery trans.,
1997); cf Psalms 119:71 (KingJames) ("[It is] good for me that I have been afflicted, that I
might learn thy statutes.").
218 Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIsT 475, 477-79 (1968).
219 Herbert Fingarette, Punishment and Suffering, 50 PROC, Am. PHIL. ASs'N 499, 510
(1977).
220 Jeffrie Murphy, Hatred: A Qualified Defense, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note
150, at 88, 89; see also KANT, METAPHYSICS, supra note 116, at *332-*33 (suggesting that
punishment should humble or humiliate some offenders' pride and vanity); KANT, PHILOS-
OPHY, supra note 116, at 197-98 (same).
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this lesson to the offender, the victim, and the community. But a
quick Alford or nolo contendere plea short-circuits the process, al-
lowing offenders and their families to remain in denial. 221 Offenders
avoid the shame and guilt of admitting their deeds, even though they
have earned this shame and guilt.
Proponents of nolo and Alford pleas also argue that these pleas
ease the strain on the relationship between defendants and defense
counsel. As Alschuler and Steven Walburn suggest, defendants often
balk at admitting guilt, even to their lawyers. Defense lawyers can
avoid friction by allowing clients to enter Alford pleas instead of press-
ing clients to admit guilt.2 22 This view fits with the dominant view of
lawyering as gamesmanship in which the defense lawyer's job is to
avoid conviction, minimize punishment, and further the client's
wishes. Lawyers can serve clients' interests in a variety of ways, from
actively confronting and challenging clients when preparing for trial
to accepting clients' assertions of fact or expressions of preference.
In the context of defendants who are in denial, however, the
gamesmanship model is misguided. It ignores the constructive role
that defense lawyers can play in educating and transforming clients'
misperceptions and short-term desires. Instead, it takes short-term
desires as a given, even when these clients are suffering from psycho-
logical blocks that obstruct their long-term interests and values. 223
Lawyers can recognize that substance abuse, mental illness, psycholog-
ical blind spots and denial, or simple shortsightedness impedes their
221 See supra text accompanying note 184 (relating anecdotal evidence that defendants
who enter nolo pleas and their families remain defiant and in denial, which further injures
victims and impedes offender treatment, whereas defendants who must plead guilty do not
continue to maintain innocence to themselves and their families, thereby facilitating ther-
apy and healing victims).
222 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1287-90; Walburn, supra note 54, at 143.
223 See David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 472-73
(arguing that lawyers should disregard their clients' immediate wants when they conflict
with their values or interests); cf WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OFJUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS' ETHICS 8-10, 138-69 (1998) (opposing the dominant view that calls for lawyers to
serve only their clients' interests, and instead proposing that lawyers take "such actions as,
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote
justice").
In contrast to defense counsel, guardians are often authorized to put their wards'
long-term interests above their short-term desires. See Frances Gall Hill, Clinical Education
and the "Best Interest" Representation of Children in Custody Disputes: Challenges and Opportunities
in Lawyering and Pedagogy, 73 IND. L.J. 605, 617-24 (1998) (defending the need for guardi-
ans ad litem to place minors' interests above their expressed desires, because minors may
lack cognitive skills, maturity, and judgment, or may harm themselves). The Model Rules
of Professional Conduct distinguish between the roles of guardians and lawyers by provid-
ing that, to the extent possible, lawyers should treat disabled clients just like any other
clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2002). The Rules recognize, how-
ever, that in some situations wards need guardians to make decisions for them or at least
guide them in making these decisions. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b)
(2002).
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clients' rationality.224 More importantly, they can persuade clients to
face up to patterns of behavior that, if left unchecked, will lead to
more crimes and punishment. 225 As suggested by the psychological
literature cited earlier, lawyers can confront their clients with the over-
whelming evidence of guilt and break down their denials. 226 Further-
more, lawyers can provide moral as well as legal counsel, advising
clients that it is right to admit their crime, apologize to victims, and
move forward. 227 By penetrating clients' denials to others and them-
selves, defense counsel can begin the process of honesty, education,
and reform.
Some, but not all, defense attorneys do challenge their clients.
Other lawyers say, "Yes, you are innocent, but a jury would probably
convict you at trial, so enter an Alford or nolo contendere plea." As
one psychologist notes, defense lawyers exacerbate the problem by
failing to challenge their clients' denials. 228 The dominant client-cen-
tered approach to legal counseling discourages painful confession. 229
Indeed, some defense lawyers purposely avoid learning all the facts
about guilt, so that they remain free to make arguments that run
counter to the undiscovered facts.2 30 This see-no-evil approach not
only leaves offenders' illusions and denials in place but also com-
224 See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Some Reflections on TherapeuticJurisprudence and the Practice
of Criminal Law, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 206-08 (2002) (citing the example of a defense
lawyer who will accept cases from habitual drunk drivers only if they accept responsibility
and get treatment for their underlying alcoholism, which can mitigate punishment and
serve clients' long-term interests).
225 See Friedman v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 834-35 (Minn. 1991) (not-
ing the important role that defense counsel play in drunk-driving cases in encouraging
problem drinkers to seek treatment); Astrid Birgden, Dealing with the Resistant Criminal Cli-
ent: A Psychologically-Minded Strategy for More Effective Legal Counseling, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 225,
227-29, 238-42 (2002); Wexler, supra note 224, at 206-08; Bruce J. Winick, Redefining the
Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence/Preventive Law Model, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 1034, 1041, 1066-76 (1999).
226 See Wexler, supra note 67, at 286; supra note 67 and accompanying text.
227 MODEL RULES Or PROF'L CONDUcT R. 2.1 (2002) ("In rendering advice, a lawyer
may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.").
228 This tendency to resist challenges is all too frequently exacerbated by the
fact that their defense lawyer has, perhaps unintentionally, encouraged
them to present an exculpatory view of the offense .... This encourage-
ment by lawyers[,] and a failure to challenge by professionals, are seen by
the offender as confirmation of his claims and this, of course, makes him all
the more resistant to challenges. Repeated disclosures followed by support-
ive challenges are, therefore, necessary.
Marshall, supra note 173, at 562; see supra text accompanying note 179.
229 See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from
Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REV. 327, 381-83 (1998) (opposing client-centered counseling's
emphasis on avoiding the painful consequences of confession, and proposing instead that
lawyers serve as clients' friends, offering moral counsel and perhaps encouraging clients to
confess in order to reap forgiveness and reconciliation).
230 KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT
WORK 103-04 (1985).
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pounds them. Clients interpret this failure to challenge as confirma-
tion and become even more resistant to the challenges required
during therapy and rehabilitation.2 3 1 Instead of repenting and mov-
ing forward, offenders may continue to pity themselves, focusing their
energies on collateral attacks instead of making amends. The focus of
the criminal process should be teaching the offender and opening his
eyes during his journey to prison. Allowing defense counsel to take
the easy way out impedes the learning process and disserves the cli-
ent's long-term interests. Judges and prosecutors should also focus
more on healing, teaching, and vindicating than on serving their own
selfish or shortsighted interests in clearing their dockets.
Even if Alford and nolo contendere pleas do not impair the of-
fender's own education and reform, they hurt others by undercutting
deterrence. Offenders dislike admitting guilt and suffering collateral
estoppel in related civil lawsuits. 23 2 Alford pleas allow offenders to
avoid declaring guilt, and nolo contendere pleas let them avoid both
admitting guilt and collateral estoppel at the expense of victims and
the civil courts. Victims already find it difficult with the benefit of
estoppel to collect compensation and restitution. Nolo contendere
pleas compound the problem by letting offenders relitigate their con-
victions. Victims and civil courts must spend more time and money to
collect compensation. Yet there is no good reason to allow relitiga-
tion: if there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a crime, then a
fortiori there is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and estop-
pel should attach.23. 3 The failure to estop defendants and reinforce
guilt is yet another way that these pleas equivocate and undermine the
criminal law's message.
Alford and nolo contendere pleas also hurt victims and the com-
munity by preventing victims' vindication. Victims lose their day in
231 Marshall, supra note 173, at 562.
23 2 Much of this Article argues that honest admissions of guilt serve important moral
goals that are incommensurable with other goals such as cost saving and deterrence. If
one rejects this moral approach and analyzes the problem solely from an economic stand-
point, one must balance the additional deterrent effect of having to admit guilt against the
costs of additional trials. Though in theory one could imagine trading off admissions of
guilt in particular cases for cost saving and other ways of achieving deterrence, in practice a
blanket ban on Alford and nolo contendere pleas is preferable. First, a blanket ban sends a
clear, unequivocal message to the public and prospective criminals. Second, prosecutors
and judges suffer a serious agency-cost problem. As Part II.C suggested, they may prefer to
allow Alford and nolo contendere pleas to reduce their own workloads, even when the long-
term effect is to Undercut deterrence. Thus, the better rule is a complete or nearly com-
plete ban.
233 It is hard to know exactly how significant estoppel is in practice or how often it
becomes an issue in subsequent civil litigation. My interviews revealed that it was men-
tioned frequently as ajustification for nolo contendere pleas, implying that the prospect of
civil litigation comes tip with some regularity. This is particularly true in automobile-acci-
dent cases because insurance companies with deep pockets are involved. See supra Part
II.C.
1406 [Vol. 88:1361
2003] HARMONIZING SUBSTANTIVE-CRIMINAL-LAW VALUES 1407
court, their chance to vent their sorrows and ask for justice, without
receiving even an admission of wrongdoing or an apology.2 3 4 Molesta-
tion victims, for example, can suffer more harm when courts appear
to accept the molesters' denials, because this judicial acceptance
seems to suggest that the victims are liars.2 35 Traumatized victims
seeking closure may be more reluctant to pursue these claims at all,
and thus society loses the authoritative vindication of its norms and
the repudiation of the wrong. Instead of communicating that punish-
ment is moral denunciation based on true desert, society treats it as a
marketable good, undermining its moral authority.2 36 Of course,
many pleas are not well publicized, but to the extent that victims and
the public do learn of such pleas, they take away the wrong message.
Simply put, the efficiency of these pleas undermines catharsis, expres-
sive condemnation, and vindication of the community's norms.
Alford and nolo contendere pleas may well be constitutional.2 37
But constitutionality does not equal wisdom, and though our Consti-
tution may tolerate these pleas, they are nonetheless unwise and
should be abolished. Indeed, Alford left this option open, recognizing
234 See Carrie J. Petrucci, Apology in the CriminalJustice Setting: Evidence for Including Apol-
ogy as an Additional Component in the Legal System, 20 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 337, 351-52 (2002)
(noting that apologies correct victims' self-blame, reduce feelings of aggression and anger,
promote healing, and empower victims). This lack of vindication explains why victims
sometimes try to dissuade prosecutors from accepting Alford and nolo pleas. See Broder,
supra note 30 (noting that the family of a murder victim agreed to plea bargains for four
defendants "provided that each defendant publicly admitted his or her part in [the vic-
tim's] death"); Robert Airoldi, Ex-Fremont Priest Accepts Deal, DAILY REV. ONLINE, at http://
www.dailyreviewonline.com/Stories/0,1413,88%257E10975%257E1035690,00.html (Dec.
7, 2002) (reporting that the victim of a child molester insisted that the defendant plead
guilty rather than no contest, stating that "[i]t wasn't about the time he served, it was about
admitting guilt"). In states with victims' bills of rights, victims may be able to submit writ-
ten statements to courts at sentencing, see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1174 (West
Supp. 2001), but this vindicates them less than being heard at trial or receiving an admis-
sion of guilt at a guilty plea hearing.
235 O'Donohue & Letourneau, supra note 160, at 299-300 ("[Clontinued denial can
cause further harm to the abused child in that implicitly or explicitly, the child is being
characterized as a liar and perhaps not believed by some.").
236 See Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 38, at 670-80 (arguing
that plea bargaining wrongly commodifies freedom, the right to be heard, and penological
objectives and sells them very cheaply); Alschuler, Book Review, supra note 39, at 1041
(noting that plea bargaining "encourages . . . defendant[s] to believe that [they] ha[ve]
sold a commodity and ... gotten away with [their crime]," thereby cheapening the system);
see also Kahan, supra note 153, at 593 (explaining that fines are no substitute for imprison-
ment because the public interprets them as licensing crimes so long as the offender is
willing to pay, thus undermining the criminal law's message of moral condemnation); Mar-
garetJane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1903-09 (1987) (arguing
that certain goods central to human flourishing must remain inalienable and therefore
should not be commodified).
237 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting the historical pedigree of nolo
contendere pleas and the dispute over whether in fact they were available for felonies and
offenses punishable by imprisonment).
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that these pleas are permissible but not required.2 38 Legislatures are
perfectly free to ban these pleas. Until they do so, judges are free to
reject these pleas, prosecutors may vigorously oppose them, and de-
fense counsel may advise their clients to confront guilt instead of tak-
ing the easy way out.23 9 Unequivocal pleas or trials may be less
efficient and require more work, but in the long run they better serve
the moral values underlying the criminal law.
CONCLUSION
The legal system has streamlined the guilty-plea process to allow
the maximum entry of guilty pleas with a minimum amount of work.
We are so obsessed with efficiency that even a defendant's protesta-
tions of innocence do not give us pause. This assembly-line approach
to criminal procedure downplays the importance of innocence and
fairness. It also ignores important substantive values of the criminal
law, which should carry great weight or even take precedence over
procedural values. Scholars should closely scrutinize procedures that
may undercut substantive values, but they do not.
This problem reflects a broader gulf between procedure and sub-
stance. Scholars often reify the artificial curricular distinctions be-
tween subjects, which can obscure how procedure serves or hinders
substance and vice versa. We often ask whether a given procedure is
efficient, accurate, or constitutional. Efficiency, in particular, has
driven us to our wholesale embrace of guilty pleas, lest we be bur-
dened with expensive and time-consuming trials. But we rarely ask if a
procedure deters, educates, inflicts retribution, or produces catharsis.
Nor do we ask if it undercuts the criminal law's moral norms, such as
honesty, trustworthiness, self-discipline, nonviolence, and respect for
others.
Looking at procedures through this substantive-values lens, the
disappearance of jury trials is cause for more concern. Jury trials are
far from efficient and sometimes inaccurate. But they serve as moral-
ity plays, expressing the community's conscience, allowing victims to
voice grievances, and teaching offenders and others by vindicating so-
ciety's norms. Unfortunately, jury trials have all but disappeared, ac-
counting for fewer than four percent of all cases. 24°1 Therefore, we
238 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970).
239 No-contest pleas might be necessary in isolated cases, such as when a defendant was
truly too intoxicated to remember anything and a trial would traumatize a vulnerable wit-
ness, or in traffic cases when a tort suit will resolve the fault issue and the minor violation
carries less moral significance. These types of justifications, however, should be excep-
tional. It is hard to imagine any case in which an Alford plea would be needed, particularly
because Alford pleas are more equivocal.
240 See U.S. DEP'r OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 2001, at 419
tbl.5.22, http://albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t522.pdf (compiling statistics that
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should at least try to incorporate these substantive values into our plea
and sentencing procedures.
I suggested in Part IV that this substantive-values approach might
require rethinking the role of defense counsel. Instead of taking their
clients' desires as a given, defense counsel might try to educate and
serve their long-term interests. For example, defense counsel might
do their clients a great service by pressing them to seek drug treat-
ment. Scholars should likewise rethink the roles of judges and prose-
cutors. The issue is not simply one of favoring defendants versus
favoring prosecutors-that view buys into the stale dichotomy be-
tween crime-control and due-process approaches. 24' Rather, it is time
to transcend this zero-sum way of looking at criminal procedure as
efficiency versus fairness, and instead think about what other values
prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers should serve. The win-at-all-
costs mentality that sometimes prevails at the bar might give way to a
broader approach. Perhaps the right incentive structures could en-
courage prosecutors and judges to care less about maximizing convic-
tions and case dispositions and more about teaching, vindicating,
healing, and reconciling.
For example, at guilty-plea allocutions, defendants can choose to
fully and honestly admit guilt and express remorse. Instead, they
often combine grudging admissions with excuses, evasions, or deflec-
tions of blame. Currently, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
vague as to when guilty pleas will earn sentencing reductions for ac-
ceptance of responsibility.242 In practice, however, many judges auto-
matically award full acceptance-of-responsibility reductions for any
guilty plea.243 Many do so no matter how grudging the defendant's
show that in 2001, of 68,633 federal defendants whose cases were not dismissed, 93.8%
pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, 2.2% had bench trials, and 4% had jury trials); id. at
445 tbl.5.44, http://albany/edu.sourcebook/1995/pdf/t544.pdf (compiling statistics that
show that in 1998, 94% of state felony convictions were by guilty plea, 3% byjury trial, and
3% by bench trial).
241 See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
242 For example, the Guidelines provide that:
Entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined with
truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and
truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct
for which he is accountable .. .will constitute significant evidence of ac-
ceptance of responsibility for the purposes of subsection (a). However, this
evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsis-
tent with such acceptance of responsibility. A defendant who enters a guilty
plea is not entitled to an adjustment under this section as a matter of right.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1 cmt. n.3 (2000).
243 See Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Responsibility": The
Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E.1.I of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1507, 1534, 1539-42 (1997) (noting that in many but not all federal districts,
judges automatically award acceptance-of-responsibility discounts to all defendants who
plead guilty).
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admissions and how little remorse he displayed.2 44 This approach
makes sense if our only concern is the efficiency of avoiding trials.
But if moral education and reform are also important goals of the
criminal process, then judges should calibrate the rewards to the de-
fendant's contrition and candor. If a defendant's full acceptance of
responsibility mattered, defense attorneys would press their clients to
come to terms with their misdeeds. Of course, some defendants
would still admit guilt only grudgingly or insincerely, but those offend-
ers may be most in need of punishment to break through their half-
denials. Furthermore, even insincere apologies and promises of re-
form have value. 24"5
Judges and victims can also help inject substantive values into
plea and sentencing procedures. For example, judges should con-
sider defendants' demeanors when imposing sentence to assess what
lessons they need to learn. Thus, the judge who will impose sentence
should hear the guilty plea whenever possible instead of passing the
plea off to a magistrate, as federal judges often do. 246 Judges also
could insist on more detailed allocutions and use more overtly moral-
istic language, driving home the wrongfulness of the crime. Similarly,
victims could confront offenders at plea or sentencing, giving voice to
the grief they have suffered. This evidence would serve neglected sub-
stantive values such as retribution, catharsis, and closure, and could
counteract prosecutors' temptations to sacrifice these values for effi-
ciency.2 47 Finally, the rhetoric of sentencing could become less a des-
iccated recitation of Sentencing Guidelines mathematics and more an
expressly moral judgment on wrongdoing.
This Article's substantive-values approach can apply in a range of
ways. A modest view would simply add substantive values to the bal-
ance or mix of values that proceduralists currently consider. A
stronger view would say that these substantive values should become
the dominant concern of criminal procedure, although this approach
conflicts with some entrenched features of our system. For example,
244 See id. at 1538. But see id. at 1539-40 (noting that in twenty-eight aberrant cases
studied, defendants who "denied or minimized their culpability" did not receive the
reduction).
245 For example, compliance theory suggests that defendants who publicly commit to
reform in front of a judge and loved ones are much more likely to reform. See David B.
Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquittee Conditional Release Process,
27 CRIM. L. BULL. 18, 26-27, 32 (1991) (making the proposal for conditional release of
defendants who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity).
246 See, e.g., United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Khan, 774 F. Stipp.
748, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
247 See David A. Starkweather, Note, The Retributive Theory of 'Just Deserts" and Victim
Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 874-75 (1992) (noting that prosecutors
must serve conflicting goals, one of which is the "swift disposition of cases").
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an important strain of this Article's argument has favored a more
moral, didactic emphasis in proceduralist reasoning. One might use
this approach to scrutinize the messages sent by established proce-
dures such as exclusionary rules, plea bargaining, the adversary sys-
tem, and even our rights-based approach. My point is not to resolve
the tradeoff between substantive and procedural values, nor to discuss
how much scholars must accommodate established practice. Procedu-
ral values, stare decisis concerns, and practical problems will all limit
the implementation of substantive values. My point is simply to show
the range of procedures that one could examine using this new lens.
Implementing these substantive values will not be simple, because
they may be less convenient and might require more time and effort
per case. But the cheapest and fastest methods are not always the
best. Criminal law should not be simply about locking up offenders
cheaply.2 48 If one purpose of criminal law is to educate the public and
teach offenders lessons, we must be willing to spend money. Proce-
dure must reinforce substance, instead of sacrificing it on the altar of
shortsighted efficiency.
This bridging of the procedure/substance divide is part of a
broader project to refocus criminal procedure. Criminal procedure
scholarship has been so preoccupied with the constitutionality of rules
that it has neglected their wisdom. Moreover, scholars focus so much
on what the U.S. Supreme Court does that we ignore the rest of the
actors in the process. The Constitution, however, sets only a floor, not
a ceiling. The Supreme Court permits Alford pleas, but that does not
mean that legislatures, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and trial judges
should use them. It is time to move beyond our ivory-tower focus on
the Supreme Court and constitutional law, and to scrutinize how pro-
cedures do and should interact with substantive values in the real
world.
248 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal
Law, 91 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 849 (2001) (noting that criminal justice treats
offenders and victims as "irrelevant nuisances," "annoying sources of inefficiency in a sys-
tem built to incapacitate the greatest number of source individuals for the longest possible
time with the least effort").
